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Abstract
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consisting of a large number of sensor nodes
are being deployed in potentially hostile environments for applications such as
forest fire detection, battlefield surveillance, habitat monitoring, traffic man-
agement, etc. One common assumption in traditional WSNs is that a trusted
third party, i.e., a sink, is assumed to be always available to collect sensed
data in a real time or near real time fashion. Although many WSNs operate
in such an on-site mode, there are WSN applications that do not fit into the
real time data collection mode. For example, data collection in Unattended
WSNs (UWSNs) relies on the periodical appearance of a mobile sink. As most
existing security solutions developed for traditional WSNs rely on the presence
of a trusted third party, it makes them not applicable to UWSNs directly. This
motivates the research on security mechanisms for UWSNs.
This dissertation contributes to security mechanisms in UWSNs from three
important aspects, as, confidentiality and reliability, trust management, and
capture resistance. The first aspect addresses data confidentiality and data
reliability in UWSNs. We propose a data distribution scheme to provide for-
ward secrecy, probabilistic backward secrecy and data reliability. Moreover,
we demonstrate that backward secrecy of the historical data can be achieved
through homomorphic encryption and key evolution. Furthermore, we propose
a constrained optimization algorithm to further improve the above two data
distribution schemes.
The second study introduces trust management in UWSNs. We propose a
set of efficient and robust trust management schemes for the case of UWSNs.
The Advanced Scheme utilizes distributed trust data storage to provide trust
data reliability and takes the advantages of both Geographic Hash Table
(GHT) and Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) to find storage nodes
and to route trust data to them. In this way, it significantly reduces storage
cost caused by distributed trust data storage and provides resilience to node
compromise and node invalidation.
The third study investigates how to detect a captured node and to resist
node capture attack in UWSNs. We propose a node capture resistance and
key refreshing scheme for UWSNs based on the Chinese remainder theorem.
The scheme is able to provide forward secrecy, backward secrecy and collusion
resistance for diminishing the effects of capture attacks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter, we present the motivation and the contributions of this disser-
tation.
1.1 Background and Motivation
In recent years, the area of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) has been ex-
tremely popular in both the research community and industries [1]. A WSN
usually consists of a large amount of different types of sensor nodes that are
able to monitor a wide variety of ambient conditions such as temperature, hu-
midity, vehicular movement, pressure, etc. These sensor nodes can be easily
deployed at a low cost for military and homeland security applications such
as battlefield surveillance, as well as for civilian areas such as environment
monitoring, E-health, and industrial automation [99, 98].
Once a WSN is deployed, sensors may generate a large volume of data
during its lifetime. These large amounts of data have to be stored somewhere
for future data retrieval and data analysis. The traditional way to collect data
sensed by sensor nodes is that sensor nodes forward the data to a sink (or
base station) immediately once they sense them, referred to as the sense-and-
transmit mode.
However, the sense-and-transmit mode suffers from several drawbacks. Firstly,
sensors around the sink may deplete their energy faster than the other sensors
in the network since the near-sink sensors need not only to deliver their own
data to the sink but also to forward data originated from many other sensors
that are farther away from the sink. As a consequence, the near-sink sen-
sors may exhaust their energy quicker and then lose their functionality totally.
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Secondly, the near-sink sensors would attract more attackers than the others
because once a small number of near-sink sensors are compromised or stop
functionality, the network would be partitioned. Thirdly, in areas hostile to
human beings such as volcanic areas, underwater zones, battle fields, animal
habitats, etc., sensors are usually deployed by airplanes or helicopters, creating
the predicament of imprecise sensor location and coverage uncertainty. Due
to the aforementioned reasons, it may be infeasible to deploy a fixed sink (or
base station). Alternatively, another form of WSNs, Unattended Wireless Sen-
sor Networks (UWSNs) have been proposed recently [23, 24], in which sensors
cannot off-load data to a sink at will or in real-time since an on-site sink or
a base station in the network does not exist. Instead, as shown in Fig. 1.1,
a mobile sink (denoted as MS hereafter), e.g., cell phones, Personal Digital
Assistant (PDAs), robots, etc., visits the network periodically to collect data.
base station
mobile sink
sensor
Figure 1.1: An illustration of UWSNs.
To guarantee the success of WSN applications, especially for those mission
critical applications in hostile environments, many security mechanisms [70, 34,
50, 49, 81, 51, 69, 121, 39, 120, 36, 52, 92, 91] have been proposed. However,
those schemes cannot be applied to UWSNs directly since they rely on the
presence of an on-site trusted third party, i.e., a sink or a base station, for
their mechanism design. These limitations motivate the design of security
mechanisms in UWSNs [59, 23, 21, 103, 60, 57, 27, 58, 22, 24, 114, 25, 26, 28,
29, 53, 15]. A list of interesting topics for security in UWSNs are as follows:
1. How to provide data confidentiality? More specifically, forward secrecy
and backward secrecy?
2. How to provide data reliability?
3. How to provide data integrity?
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4. How to minimize resource consumption due to accumulated data? Specif-
ically, data storage cost, Message Authentication Code (MAC) storage
cost, and energy cost?
5. How to design light weight searchable encryption scheme for sensors?
6. How to design trust management schemes in UWSNs?
7. How to detect a captured sensor?
8. How to diminish the effects of compromised sensors?
9. How to protect the location privacy of anMS?
10. How to avoid impersonating the behavior of a realMS in the event that
it is captured (or comprised) by an adversary?
11. How to design the optimal travel route to collect accumulated sensor
data with least security risk toMS?
1.2 Security Concerns
In this thesis, we try to answer the questions 1, 2, 6, 7 and 8. At the beginning,
we explain the security concerns: intrusion-resilient data security and node
capture resistance.
1.2.1 Intrusion-resilient Data Security
Due to the absence of an on-site trusted third party in UWSNs, the accumu-
lated data in sensors impose new security challenges - forward secrecy, back-
ward secrecy and data reliability.
To shed more light on those security issues in UWSNs, we investigate the
security implications for UWSNs versus traditional 1 WSNs under the mobile
adversary model [60, 21]. In this model, each sensor generates data in each
round r ∈ R. There is an ADV roaming in the network, compromising and
releasing sensors to enrich its knowledge on all collected data. To illustrate
the model, we assume that a mobile adversary (denoted as ADV hereafter)
compromises a sensor at round ra, releases the sensor at round rb, and compro-
mises it again at round rc, where ra < rb < rc, as shown in Fig. 1.2. The data
1Here, the term traditional means that there is at least one on-site sink in the network.
4 Security Mechanisms in Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks
generated between rounds rl and ra is denoted as D(rl, ra) , so as D(ra, rb) and
D(rb, rc), respectively. Between rounds ra and rb, the ADV is residing in the
sensor, and we refer to this time interval as reside period Trp.
compromise release return 
forward secrecy reside period   backward secrecy rpT
ar br crlr vr time
Figure 1.2: The mobile adversary model.
• In traditional WSNs, after generating data, the data are sent to and are
kept in an on-site sink. The data generated before compromising (i.e.,
D(rl, ra)) and between releasing and returning (i.e., D(rb, rv)) are kept
in the on-site sink, which is considered as trusted.
• In UWSNs, an MS collects data and leaves the network at round rl,
and comes back at round rv to collect data again. The data generated
between rounds rl and rv are accumulated and stored in the sensor locally.
Consequently the data generated between rounds rl and ra (i.e., D(rl, ra))
are obtained by the ADV if the sensor is compromised at round ra. So
do D(rb, rc) if the ADV compromises the sensor again at rc.
• In this model, no matter whatever security mechanisms are employed,
the data generated in the reside period Trp are captured by the ADV .
The security implications for traditional WSNs and UWSNs under the mobile
adversary model are summarized in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Security implications under the mobile adversary model: traditional
WSNs versus UWSNs.
Traditional WSNs UWSNs
D(rl, ra) sent to the on-site sink captured by ADV
D(ra, rb) captured by ADV captured by ADV
D(rb, rc) sent to the on-site sink captured by ADV
As explained above, a fundamental security task in UWSNs is how to pro-
tect the data collected before the reside period and the data collected after
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the reside period from the ADV . To carry out these tasks, a set of notions,
forward secrecy, backward secrecy 2 and data reliability, need to be defined.
Let cri denote the ciphertext encrypted by a sensor si in round r.
Definition 1.1. (Forward secrecy) Forward secrecy is provided if for any
ADV , it is computationally infeasible for the ADV to obtain any information
about ciphertext cri (r ∈ [rl, ra)), even if a set of secret keys obtained during
the reside period Trp = [ra, rb] are available.
Definition 1.2. (Backward secrecy) Backward secrecy is provided if for any
ADV , it is computationally infeasible for the ADV to obtain any information
about ciphertext cri (r > rb), even if a set of secret keys obtained during the
reside period Trp = [ra, rb] are available.
Sensor crash attack is a general threat when a UWSN is deployed in hostile
environments. Sensor nodes may lose their functionality due to natural disaster
(e.g., flood, stone storm), energy depletion, or physical attacks by ADVs.
Definition 1.3. (Data reliability) Data reliability is defined as the degree
of resilience of data stored in sensor nodes against physical attacks on sensors.
Data resilience is evaluated by calculating the fraction of sensor nodes that
lose functionality.
1.2.2 Node Capture Resistance
In addition to protecting the accumulated data from ADV when sensors are
compromised, it is important to 1) detect whether a (or which) sensor is cap-
tured from the network as early as possible; and 2) adopt security mechanisms
to diminish the effects of the compromised sensors.
Indeed, the advance in robotics nowadays enables us to develop a variety
of mobile devices [20] to form Mobile UWSNs (MUWSNs). Mobile devices,
especially small robots with sensing, wireless communication, and mobility
capability, are useful for applications such as adaptive sampling, static sensor
deployment and event detection [56, 112].
Consider a scenario where both sink and sensor nodes are mobile, as shown
in Fig. 1.3. A Sensor Equipped Aquatic Swarm (SEA Swarm) [105] is proposed
2In some literature, e.g., [31], forward secrecy and backward secrecy are defined in an
opposite way to ours.
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to support time critical applications, such as submarine tracking and harbor
monitoring. The SEA Swarm consists of a large number of underwater sensor
nodes, air-dropped to the venue of interest. Each node can dynamically control
the depths using the bladders and on-board pressure gauges, operate and move
as swarm with water current, searching for invasive submarine or scouting the
waters around harbor or underwater mining facilities [44]. There are a few
unmanned submarines (equipped with sink or base station) that can receive
alert messages from sensor nodes. Assume that an invasive submarine intends
to go through the surveillance area covered by an MUWSN. To do so, the
submarine tries to capture a sensor from the network, re-programme it and
re-deploy it in the network to make an unsurveilled hole in the network so that
the submarine can go through the surveillance area undiscovered. Through the
captured node, a large number of replica nodes can be generated and spread
throughout the network based on the software and secret keys obtained from
the captured node. These attacks enable replicas to participate in the network
pretended as authorized nodes.
Y
X
Z
Event B
Event A
Sink B
Sink A
Figure 1.3: An example of a SEA Swarm: mobile nodes detect events and
report them to the correspondingMS/sink.
To diminish the effects of the aforementioned node capture attack, three
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issues have to be addressed. 1) Detection mechanism - how to detect node
capture attack. In addition, upon detecting captured nodes, we should revoke
the captured nodes from the network and add new nodes to maintain network
connectivity. 2) Forward security - how to prevent the newly added nodes from
reading any previously transmitted messages of the network. 3) Backward
security - how to prevent the captured node from accessing future network
communication.
1.3 Main Contributions
The main contribution of this dissertation (made by the author) is a set of novel
security mechanisms dedicated for UWSNs. More specifically, this dissertation
makes the following contributions:
Distributed Data Storage. We study how to provide both forward
secrecy, backward secrecy and data reliability simultaneously under the mobile
adversary model. We utilize key-evolution [6] and Reed-Solomon codes [74] to
achieve forward secrecy, probabilistic backward secrecy and data reliability.
Sensors update their secret key in each round using one way hash function
and use the updated secret key to encrypt data sensed in that round. We
further use data redundancy to provide data reliability. That is, the ciphertext
encrypted in each round is encoded into n data shares based on (n,m) Reed-
Solomon codes (m ≤ n), and then the data shares are distributed to the
sensor’s neighbor nodes. The original ciphertext can be reconstructed if fewer
than n−m data shares are lost.
However, the key evolution and Reed-Solomon codes based scheme cannot
provide perfect backward secrecy. We propose then a homomorphic encryp-
tion and (n,m) homomorphic secret sharing based scheme and demonstrate
that backward secrecy of historical data can be provided. In the scheme, the
data collected by sensor nodes are encoded into several shares according to
the homomorphic secret sharing scheme [7]. Then, the encoded data shares
are encrypted according to the homomorphic encryption scheme [14]. Due to
the homomorphic property, the encrypted data share generated by a sensor
node can be simply combined together in an encrypted form. Statistical data,
such as expected value, variance value, can be easily computed based on those
encrypted data values. Multiple encrypted data shares generated in a time
interval can be stored in a unit data memory, which dramatically reduces the
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storage and transmission cost as compared with traditional replication-based
schemes. In addition, our scheme ensures data reliability and confidentiality by
using a secret sharing scheme which provides redundancy by dividing data into
multiple shares and recovering data by retrieving a portion of the shares. Fur-
thermore, our scheme that takes advantage of key evolution and homomorphic
encryption can provide both forward secrecy and backward secrecy. Through
detailed analysis it is demonstrated that our scheme has low storage and trans-
mission cost as well as providing both forward secrecy and backward secrecy
compared with other existing schemes and is suitable for resource-constraint
UWSNs [93, 90].
Optimized data distribution. As mentioned above, the distributed data
storage schemes take the advantage of either (n,m) secret sharing scheme or
(n,m) Reed-Solomon codes, in which m of n data shares are required to re-
construct data, to add data redundancy for providing resilience to node inval-
idation and Byzantine failure. However, how to specify suitable values for m
and n is another important question needed to be answered. To specify (n,m)
in an optimized way, we propose a constrained optimization data distribution
scheme in which suitable values of (n,m) can be selected to maximize security
level and at the same time to maximize data reliability. We conducted simu-
lations [88] to show the superiority of our scheme in comparison with several
previous approaches developed for UWSNs [94, 89].
Trust management. In the optimized data distribution scheme, sensors’
neighbor nodes are selected based on their security levels. That is, sensors
prefer to keep their data on the neighbor nodes with higher security levels. We
argue that the trustworthiness can be used as a measurement of sensors’ secu-
rity level. We propose a trust management scheme for efficient trust generation
as well as scalable and robust trust data storage in UWSNs. A central issue for
trust management in UWSNs is how to store trust data without relying on a
trusted third party. We first consider two naive schemes as a first-step attempt
to show the existing trust storage problems in UWSNs. After analyzing the
shortcomings of those two naive schemes, an advanced scheme based on Geo-
graphic Hash Table (GHT) [72] is proposed. The advanced scheme provides a
hash-table-like interface, enabling nodes put and get trust data to designated
storage nodes based on node’s identification (ID). Consequently, nodes do not
need to know the storage nodes’ IDs. Instead, they calculate a hash function
to find the location of the storage node, reducing the storage cost significantly.
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Moreover, we propose a set of similarity threshold functions to remove outliers
from trust opinions, preventing attackers from generating false trust opinions
to pollute trustworthiness. To the best of our knowledge, the design of trust
management in UWSNs has not been studied in the literature from this per-
spective. Furthermore, we give a detailed analysis of the proposed scheme
and conduct simulations using MATLAB to show that our scheme is efficient,
robust, and scalable in UWSNs [101, 100].
Node capture resistance. We propose a Sensor Capture Resistance and
Key Refreshing (SCARKER) scheme for Mobile UWSNs which improves a
node capture detection scheme proposed by [19] by providing forward secrecy,
backward secrecy as well as collusion resistance. To guarantee both forward
security and backward security, upon detecting a captured sensor, the captured
sensor will be revoked through updating group key for all sensors except the
revoked sensor. We consider an asymmetric architecture of MUWSNs where
sensors have extremely constrained computation capability and energy, while
MS has more computational capability and available energy. The asymmetric
architecture enables to allocate more computations toMS. By allocating more
computational cost to theMS, each sensor only needs to perform one modular
operation and one XOR operation for each group key update. To evaluate the
performance of the proposed scheme, we implement it on a Sun SPOT [86]
based sensor testbed and test it for different lengths of secret keys and various
numbers of sensors. Experimental results show that the time for updating a
new group key varies from 56 ms to 546 ms and energy consumption changes
within 16.5 - 225 mJ, proportional to the length of secret keys and the number
of sensors in a group. It demonstrates that our scheme significantly reduces
the computational overhead for sensors, and is thus efficient and suitable for
MUWSNs [95, 97].
1.4 Dissertation Outline
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 presents preliminary concepts.
In Chapter 3, we discuss data confidentiality and data reliability in UWSNs.
Chapter 4 introduces historical data confidentiality and data reliability in
UWSNs.
Chapter 5 discusses the problem of how to optimally distribute data shares
10 Security Mechanisms in Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks
to the neighbor nodes of sensors.
In Chapter 6, we address trust management in UWSNs.
Chapter 7 presents a node capture resistance and key refreshing scheme,
SCARKER, for MUWSNs.
Chapter 8 concludes this dissertation. We end up with a discussion of open
research problems in the area of UWSNs.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
This chapter describes a few preliminaries which constitute the blocks for the
security mechanisms proposed in this dissertation.
2.1 Erasure Code
A (n, k) erasure code encodes a block of data into n fragments, which has 1/k
the size of the original block, so that any k can be used to reconstruct the
original block. An example of such erasure coding schemes is Reed-Solomon
codes [74].
Reed Solomon Codes : For q ≥ n, let α1, ..., αn be n distinct elements of Fq.
The Reed Solomon codes of message length k, with parameters α1, ..., αn is
defined as follows. Associate with a message m = 〈m0, ...,mk−1〉 a polynomial
M(x) =
∑k−1
j=0 mjx
j. The encoding of m is the evaluation of M at n given
points, i.e., E(m) = 〈M(α1), ...,M(αn)〉. By construction, the Reed-Solomon
codes have message with length k and block length n. The message can be
reconstructed from any k blocks, and the codes can correct up to t = bn−k+1
2
c
errors.
We give a formal definition of an n-party Reed-Solomon codes algorithm
with data space DAT A as a pair Π = (ShareRS, RecoverRS), where:
• ShareRS is a probabilistic algorithm that takes an input d ∈ DAT A and
generates the n-vector P R←− ShareRS(d), where P = {p1, p2, · · · , pn}, R
means random output, and pi ∈ {0, 1}∗. If d /∈ DAT A, ShareRS returns
⊥ (“undefined”).
• RecoverRS is a deterministic algorithm that takes input P ∈ ({0, 1}∗ ∪
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♦)n, where ♦ represents a data share that has been missing (or is not
available). The RecoverRS outputs RecoverRS(P) ∈ DAT A∪⊥, where
⊥ is a distinguished value, denoting failed recovery.
2.2 Secret Sharing
Secret sharing scheme is a threshold scheme in that without enough shares,
the secret is information-theoretically secure. One of them is Shamir’s (n,m)
secret sharing scheme [79] based on polynomial interpolation, in which m of n
shares are required to reconstruct secret.
The brief procedure is in the following. The secret Θ is in Zp (p is a
prime number and p > n). Each shareholder i is in the set P (|P | = n). All
mathematical operations are in Zp. To distribute Θ, select a polynomial a(x)
with degree m− 1 and a constant term Θ. Generate a share si for each i in P
with a(x) : si = Θ +
∑m−1
j=1 aji
j. si is also in Zp. To reconstruct Θ, retrieve m
coordinate pairs (i, si) of all i in authorized subset B of P (|B| = m) and use
the pairs in the Lagrange interpolation formula to recover Θ: Θ =
∑
i∈B bisi,
where bi =
∏
j∈B,j 6=i j
j−i
.
2.3 Homomorphic Secret Sharing
Informally, homomorphic secret sharing [7] is about combining shares of in-
dependent secrets in such as a way that reconstruction from the combined
shares results in a combined secret. Let ⊕ and ⊗ be binary functions on el-
ements of the secret domain S and of the share domain T respectively. We
say that a (n, k) threshold scheme has the (⊕,⊗) - homomorphism property
if for all I ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n} determines a set of functions FI : T k → S, when-
ever data D = FI(Di1 , ..., Dik) and D′ = FI(D′i1 , ..., D
′
ik
) then D ⊕ D′ =
FI(Di1 ⊗D′ik , ..., Dik ⊗D′ik). Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is (+,+) - homo-
morphism.
2.4 Homomorphic Encryption
A privacy homomorphism [10] is an encryption function which allows the en-
crypted data to be operated on without knowledge of the decryption function.
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Let E() denote a encryption function. Let M be the message space and
C the ciphertext space such that M is a group under operation ⊗ and C
is a group under operation ⊕. E() is a (⊗,⊕) - homomorphic encryption
function if for c1 = Ek1(m1) and c2 = Ek2(m2), there exists a key k such that
c1 ⊗ c2 = Ek(m1 ⊕m2).
The authors in [14] proposed an additive homomorphic encryption scheme
such that the addition of the encrypted messages equals the encryption of those
messages’ summation. Using this scheme, ciphertext c = Enc(m, k,M) =
m+k (modM), where k is a randomly generated keystream, and k ∈ [0,M−1],
m represent a message, and m ∈ [0,M − 1], M is a large integer. To decrypt
the ciphertext, Dec(c, k,M) = c− k (modM). The addition of n ciphertexts,
n∑
i=1
ci =
n∑
i=1
Enc(mi, ki,M)
=
n∑
i=1
mi +
n∑
i=1
ki (modM) .
Thus,
Dec(
n∑
i=1
ci) =
n∑
i=1
Dec(Enc(ci, ki,M))
=
n∑
i=1
Enc(mi, ki,M)−
n∑
i=1
ki (modM) .
2.5 Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)
If integers n1, n2, · · · , nk are pairwise relatively primes, and r1, · · · , rk are in-
tegers, then the system of simultaneous congruences
X ≡ r1 (modn1)
X ≡ r2 (modn2)
...
X ≡ rk (modnk).
has exactly one solution modulo N =
∏k
i=1 ni.
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The value of X can be calculated as
X = (
k∑
i=1
ci · ri) (modN), (2.1)
where ci = QiUi, Qi = Nni and Ui is its multiplicative inverse modulo ni, i.e.
Ui = Q
−1
i (modni).
One of the important features of the CRT is that it provides a way to
hide tuples of small numbers within a larger number. Since n1, · · · , nk are
randomly picked from an unlimited large pool of pairwise relatively prime pos-
itive integers, thus knowing one (or small part) of them gains little knowledge
about the others. That is, r1, · · · , rk cannot be derived from X without know-
ing relatively pairwise primes n1, · · · , nk, whereas X cannot be derived from
r1, · · · , rk without knowing n1, · · · , nk.
Chapter 3
Data Confidentiality and Data
Reliability
In this chapter, we address secure and reliable distributed data storage in
UWSNs by designing a secure and reliable data distributed storage scheme
based on key evolution and (n,m) Reed-Solomon codes. The proposed scheme
provides forward secrecy, probabilistic backward secrecy and reliability of data
in absence of reliable nodes and communication channels.
3.1 Related Work
3.1.1 Data Secure Storage and Reliability
The authors in [23] identify, for the first time, the problem of data survival in
UWSNs in the presence of a capable mobile adversary. Their idea is to move
the sensed data to sensors’ neighbors, which is referred to as a Data-Moving
scheme. In the Data-Moving scheme, when a sensor node senses new data,
it randomly selects one node in its neighbors and moves data to it. Data-
Moving has two basic strategies: one is MOVE-ONCE, in which the sensed
data are moved to one neighbor and then remains there; the other is KEEP-
MOVING, in which the sensed data are moved to one neighbor and keep on
moving to such neighbor’s neighbor until oﬄoading to a mobile sink. However,
the KEEP-MOVING scheme has very large transmission cost caused by data
moving. To protect high-value data, they use replication as one means to
increase data survival probability. However, the tradeoff is between survival
probability and storage overhead.
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With the development of hardware technology, several new-generation sen-
sors [64, 62] equipped several gigabytes and low-power energy consumption
flash memory becomes available. The authors in [30] proposed a re-thinking
WSN architecture where the sensed data are stored locally as "historical" data
instead of sending them to the sink immediately. In doing so, the consuming
energy for data transmission can be saved to maximize the sensor’s life. How-
ever, gigabytes flash memory is not the best way to solve storage problem
since sensed data grow over the sensor lifetime. Storage efficiency should be
considered. Furthermore, data reliability was not addressed in [30].
The authors in [84] proposed a family of schemes for secure distributed
data storage and retrieval, namely, the Simple Hash-Based (SHB) scheme, the
Enhanced Hash-Based (EHB) scheme, and the Adaptive Polynomial-Based
(APB) scheme. The SHB scheme requires a network controller for data de-
cryption. Thus, the controller could become a transmission bottleneck. In the
EHB scheme, the lifetime of sensor network is divided into n phases where the
number of phases is fixed, and the data encryption keys should be initialized
and preloaded before sensor nodes are deployed. These limitations hamper
the scalability of the network. The APB scheme provides the scalability of
the network. However, data reliability and data storage efficiency were not
considered in any these three schemes.
The authors in [17] proposed a redundant residue number system to pro-
vide data confidentiality and reliability. data are encoded as (h + r)-tuples
of residues using h + r keys. Residues are distributed among the mobiles in
the network. Recovering the original data requires at least h residues and the
corresponding moduli. Data can be recovered even when up to s ≤ r residues
are lost, and data confidentiality is ensured since recovering the original data
requires knowledge of the entire set of moduli. Unfortunately, data storage
and transmission efficiency issues were not addressed.
3.1.2 Forward Secrecy and Backward Secrecy
In recent years, many schemes have been proposed to achieve either forward
secrecy [5, 42] only or both forward secrecy and backward secrecy [43, 33, 31,
32]. Generally, key evolution is a common approach in all of these schemes
to provide forward secrecy. Its basic idea is that secret key Ki is updated by
applying a secure hash function at each round r, e.g., Kri = h(Kr−1i ) (r ≥
1 andK0i = Ki). Because of the one-way property of the secure hash function,
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deriving the previous rounds’ keys (pre-compromised) based on the current
round key is infeasible.
However, the aforementioned public cryptography based approaches [43,
33, 31, 32] are not suitable for UWSNs because sensor nodes only use the
public key of the sink to encrypt data in these approaches. Whereas, sensors
are usually considered as resource constrained devices that cannot afford use
of public key cryptography.
In the context of WSNs, [71] proposed a secure information aggregation
protocol relaying on key evolution to provide forward secrecy but without
guarantee of backward secrecy. The authors in [65] proposed a protocol to
maintain secrecy between a pair of network neighbors. In [65], both forward
secrecy and backward secrecy for keys shared pairwise by two sensors are
provided. The security is based on assumption that two sensors cannot be
compromised at the same time.
A more recent study [60] proposed a DIstributed Self-Healing (DISH) ap-
proach. The basic idea of DISH is that unattended sensors attempt to recover
from sick states and maintain forward secrecy and backward secrecy of the
collected data. In DISH, forward secrecy is provided through key evolution.
However, DISH does not guarantee backward secrecy. Instead, it provides
probabilistic backward secrecy which depends on conditions such as compro-
mising capability of the mobile adversary (number of nodes it can compromise
at a given time interval), and for how often the MS successively visits the
network. The authors in [21] proposed Proactive co-Operative Self-Healing
(POSH) scheme which has improved DISH [60]. The basic mechanism of
self-healing in POSH is the same, which makes sick sensors receive random
contributions from healthy peers to become healthy again. The difference is
that the DISH scheme is referred to as a pull model because sensors request
contributions from peers; whereas, the POSH scheme is referred to as a push
model in which sponsors volunteering their contributions. In other words, in
the push model, sensors send their contributions to randomly selected neigh-
bors without receiving any requests.
Both DISH [60] and POSH [21] are proposed to provide forward secrecy and
merely certain probabilistic backward secrecy in ideal networks where sensors
and communication channels are reliable. However, they are not resilient to
node failure and Byzantine failure. Aiming at solving this problem, the authors
in [109] take advantage of (n, k) secret sharing and (n,m) Reed-Solomon codes,
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in whichm (or k) of n data shares are required to reconstruct data, adding data
redundancy to provide resilience to node invalidation and Byzantine failure.
However, neither forward secrecy, backward secrecy nor how to choose m and
n are addressed in their work.
In summary, none of the above mentioned schemes provide the overall
requirements of forward secrecy, backward secrecy and data reliability needed
for UWSNs.
3.2 Models and Assumptions
In this section, we present our assumption about the network model and the
threat model, and define the design goals of the scheme.
3.2.1 Network Model
We consider a UWSN that consists of N sensor nodes, denoted as si ∈ S,
where S = {si}Ni=1. A node, si, has nbi neighbors, which compose a neighbor
node set, NBi, for si. There is anMS that visits the UWSN periodically to
collect data. The time interval between the current visit and the previous visit
is denoted as T . Sensor si collects data at each round, and the data generated
at round r is denoted as dri . Let R denote the number of rounds between
successive retrieving the sensed data. Once dri is generated, it is stored locally,
and waits until an authorizedMS oﬄoads it. Each sensor has the ability to
perform one-way hashing and symmetric key encryption. Furthermore, MS
is assumed to be a trusted party which cannot be compromised. Additionally,
MS will re-instantiate the secret keys and reset the round counters when it
visits the network.
A list of notations is summarized in Table 3.1.
3.2.2 Threat Model
The UWSNs can be attacked in many ways [54, 120, 36]. In this study, we
focus on a mobile adversary [60] (denoted as ADV hereafter) that performs
roaming in the UWSN while MS is absent. The ADV has capabilities as
follows:
• Compromising ability: The ADV can compromise up to k < N sensors
during a time interval T . Once a sensor si is compromised by the ADV ,
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Table 3.1: Notations.
MS mobile sink
ADV mobile adversary
N number of sensor nodes in a UWSN
si sensor i
NBi set of neighbor sensor nodes of si
nbi the number of nodes in NBi
Kri secret key of sensor si in round r
T time interval of two visiting
r round index
R number of rounds between successive sink visits
dri sensed data collected by sensor i at round r
all the storage content will be revealed, including secret keys, encrypted
data, hash function, etc.; and all incoming and outgoing communication
will be monitored.
• Topology knowledge: The ADV has the knowledge about the network
topology. It can choose any node to compromise.
• No interference: The ADV would not interfere with the communications
between nodes, nor rework any data sensed by, or stored by sensors it
compromises. In other words, theADV is read-only (or passive) attacker.
• Strictly local eavesdropping: The ADV is unable to monitor and record
the communications of other nodes. It can only eavesdrop incoming and
outgoing communications from and to the currently compromised nodes.
In addition to the attacks mentioned above, ADV has attack strategies as
follows:
• Read-only ADV: Its goal is to learn as much sensed data as possible.
• ADV_del: ADV_del tries to prevent certain target data from reaching
the sink. For example, in a nuclear emission monitoring application, sink
will raise the alarm if one of the sensing nodes reports a value above a
pre-specified threshold. ADV_del thus aims to find that value and erase
it before it ever reaches the sink. ADV_del might be undetected if the
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sink tolerates some missing measurements (due to occasional errors or
malfunctions).
• ADV_md: If the sink has no tolerance for lost data, ADV changes its
strategy from ADV_del to ADV_md, in the sense that ADV replaces
the target data with a value within the threshold.
3.2.3 Design Goals
The design goals are to guarantee forward secrecy, backward secrecy and data
reliability as defined in Section 1.1.
3.3 The Proposed Schemes
In this section, we investigate a family of schemes for secure and reliable data
storage in UWSNs, named as Naive scheme, Advanced scheme and Enhanced
scheme respectively, Each latter scheme improves over the previous one by
addressing some of its limitations.
3.3.1 Naive Scheme (NS)
In the NS, a sensor node, si, generates a data dri in round r, and stores it
locally. To protect data, it can perform the following operations.
Step 1 : Initially, MS picks a secret key denoted as Km. The initial key
of sensor node si can be computed as Ki = h(Km||i) which is set up before
the deployment of the UWSN. Here, || stands for the concatenation operator.
MS only needs to store one key, because it can use Km to compute all the
secret keys deployed in si, 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Step 2 : si generates a keyed hash value of data dri generated in round r,
using key Ki. The keyed hash value, denoted as MACri = h(dri ||Ki) protects
data integrity.
Step 3 : The plaintext data, denoted as dri ||MACri , is encrypted by using
key Ki. The encryption of data, denoted as Enc(Ki||dri ||MACri ), protects data
confidentiality.
Discussion. Once sensor si is compromised at round ra, the ADV holds
the secret key Ki of this sensor. Consequently, all the data generated before
the sensor is compromised is revealed, because all the data encrypted before
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round ra are encrypted by the same key Ki which is now held by the ADV .
Thus, the forward secrecy is not provided. Moreover, once the ADV returns
at rounds rc (rb < ra), it still can decrypt the data generated between round rb
and rc, even if the ADV was not present in the time interval. Therefore, the
backward secrecy is not provided either.
To solve the aforementioned problems, we further propose two schemes -
Advanced scheme and Enhanced scheme.
3.3.2 Advanced Scheme (AS)
Since the sensor keeps the secret key unchanged in NS, all encrypted data
can be read by ADV , no matter the data are generated before or after the
compromised period. In other words, the ADV only needs to compromise
the sensors once and gets the secret key consequently. Therefore, we need to
change the secret key after each round. The AS is designed as follows:
Since hash function has one-way property, si updates its secret key at each
round, that is Kri = h(Kr−1i ), r ≥ 1. This means that the ADV which holds the
secret key Kri in compromised time interval [ra, rb] (r ∈ [ra, rb]) cannot derive
any previous key Krˆi , (rˆ < ra), where Kri is the secret key of sensor si at round
r, and h(·) is a one-way hash function. Similar to NS, after si generates new
data dri at round r, it firstly encrypts the dri with Kri by Enc(Kri ||dri ||MACri ),
and stores it locally. It then updates its secret key as Kr+1i = h(Kri ), and
finally the Kri is securely erased. MS can easily compute the corresponding
secret key of si at round r for Kri = hr−1(Ki) = hr−1(Km||i).
Discussion. Since the secret key Kri updates itself at each round, the ADV
cannot derive the key from previous rounds (before the sensor was compro-
mised) due to the one-way property of h(·). Thus, forward secrecy is provided.
However, the ADV which holds the secret key Kri , r ∈ [ra, rb] still can derive
the future key which will be used in the following rounds. In other words, if
the ADV returns at round rc (rb < rc), it still can decrypt the data which
was encrypted in time interval [rb, rc], by mimicking key updates. Therefore,
the backward secrecy is not guaranteed. Furthermore, since all the gener-
ated data are stored locally in the sensor nodes, data would be lost if sensor
nodes lose functionality due to physical attacks launched by ADV as defined
in Subsection 3.2.2. Consequently, data reliability is not provided. To guaran-
tee both forward secrecy and backward secrecy as well as data reliability, we
propose the Enhanced scheme.
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3.3.3 Enhanced Scheme (ES)
We observe that data encrypted by symmetric encryption cannot guarantee
backward secrecy. It holds as long as a sensor relies only on itself for security.
As will be discussed later, backward secrecy can be probabilistically achieved
if sensors cooperate with their neighbors. Moreover, we believe that data reli-
ability is also provided if sensors cooperate with their neighbors since we could
add data redundancy to provide data reliability. To do so, a straightforward
way is to send data replication to their neighbor nodes. Consequently sensors
are resilient to physical attacks since data replication is still available in the
network even when some fraction of sensor nodes totally lose functionality.
However, the effect is that data replication would cause large storage overhead
since the size of data replication is the same as the original data, which is
not affordable in storage constrained sensor nodes. Therefore, the new scheme
should provide data reliability with low storage overhead.
To reduce storage requirement, the (n,m) Reed-Solomon codes can divide
a block of data into n shares, each has 1
m
the size of the original block. The
original data can be reconstructed if m or more data shares are available. We
take the advantage of (n,m) Reed-Solomon codes to provide physical attack
resilience with low storage cost.
The ES that satisfies the mentioned above requirements contains the fol-
lowing steps:
Step 1: System initialization.
MS picks a secure hash function, denoted as h(·), and a secret key denoted
as Km. Before deploying each sensor node, MS preloads to the sensor hash
function h(·), and initial data encryption key Ki for each sensor, si. Here, Ki
is computed as h(Km||i). In the end of each round, the round index r and
the encryption key Kri are updated as Kri = h(Kr−1i ), where r = 1, 2, ... and
K0i = Ki. Again,MS only needs to store a single secret key Km and all round
keys Kri can be derived when needed.
Step 2: Distributed data storage.
Each sensor si firstly generates a keyed hash value with round key Kri as
MACri = h(d
r
i ||Kri ), and then a plaintext data that consists of dri , MACri , and
values r and si, denoted as PLtextri = dri ||MACri ||r||si, is encrypted by using
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updated key Kri . The encryption data are denoted as
ENtextri = Enc(Kri , PLtextri )
= Enc(Kri ||dri ||MACri ||r||si).
Thus, the integrity and forward secrecy of the sensed data are provided.
dri is included in
mri = ENtext
r
i ||r||si.
Step 3: Data shares generation.
Sensor si employs (n,m) Reed-Solomon codes to split ENtextri into n data
shares, denoted as a set Pi = {pri,1, pri,2, · · · , pri,n}.
Step 4: Data distribution.
Sensor si selects top n security level neighbors in set NBi (e.g., sj) based
on node selection scheme (more details in Chapter 5), and sends one randomly
selected distinct data share mri,j = pri,j||r||si to sj by using pairwise secret key
Ki,j to encrypt the packet.
si → sj : Enc(Ki,j,mri,j).
After the data are distributed, the original data are securely erased.
Step 5: Data reconstruction.
MS collects m data shares from nodes and reconstructs data using (n,m)
Reed-Solomon codes.
3.4 Analysis
We analyze in this section the efficiency of ES in terms of efficiency and security.
3.4.1 Efficiency Analysis
3.4.1.1 Computation Cost
At each round, the data source node si needs to perform two hash oper-
ations, to update key Kri = hr−1(Km||i) and then to compute MACri =
h(dri ||Kri ), and two symmetric encryptions ENtextri = Enc(Kri , PLtextri ) and
Enc(Ki,j,mri,j). To generate distributed data shares, si encodes ENtextri into
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n data shares using Reed-Solomon codes. Let γ and β denote the size of Km||i
and dri ||Kri , respectively. The total computation cost at the data source node
si is Hash1γ+Hash1β+SymEnc2+RSCoding1, where Hash1γ denotes one hash
operation with input size of γ, SymEnc2 denotes two symmetric encryptions,
and RSCoding1 denotes one Reed-Solomon codes operation. The computation
cost at data share holders is only one symmetric decryption operation.
3.4.1.2 Storage Overhead and Communication Overhead
We regard symbols si, Kri , and r as the elements of the Galois Field GF (2q)
(e.g., q = 8, 16). After si generates data shares, si would sendEnc(Ki,j, {pri,j, {r, si}})
to one of its neighbors, sj, where pri,j is the output of coding ENtextri using
Reed-Solomon codes. Assume ENtextri contains φ symbols. Due to the prop-
erty of Reed-Solomon codes, the size of pri,j is
φ
m
. In addition, each node needs
nbi ∗ q bits storage overhead to maintain a probability vector. Thus, the com-
munication overhead during the distribution is approximately n ∗ ( φ
m
+ 2) ∗ q
bits, and it requires ( φ
m
+ nbi + 2) ∗ q bits storage overhead to keep the data
shares at each data holder.
3.4.2 Security Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the security aspects of ES with respect to Read-
only ADV , ADV_del and ADV_md.
3.4.2.1 Read-only ADV
Proposition 3.1. The Enhanced scheme provides forward secrecy.
Proof. Since the secret key Kri of a sensor si is updated as Kri = h(Kr−1i ),
where r = 1, 2, ... and K0i = Ki, ADV cannot derive the previous key from
the current key due to the one-way property of hash function h(·). Hence the
ADV cannot decrypt the data encrypted and stored in the previous rounds.
Therefore, the forward secrecy is provided.
Lemma 3.2. The backward secrecy of the sensor si can be compromised by
ADV, if and only if the following three conditions are satisfied.
1. sensor si is compromised by the ADV ;
2. the ADV ’s compromising ability k > m;
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3. the ADV compromised at least m neighbor nodes of si that store the
corresponding data shares.
Proof. Recall that, according to Definition 1.2, the backward secrecy of si is
the security of data generated and encrypted after the reside period Trp. As
shown in Fig. 1.2, sensor si is compromised by an ADV at round ra. After
that, the ADV resides in si and releases si at round rb, the time interval
between round ra and rb is defined as reside period Trp. In other words, if the
backward secrecy of the si is compromised, meaning that the data generated
and encrypted after round rb is compromised by the ADV which is based on
the secrecy obtained during Trp. Thus, if the ADV wants to compromise the
backward secrecy of si, it has to firstly compromise si to get the secret key
Krai and hash function that used to generate future keys. Secondly, the ADV
must have enough compromising ability (k > m). Thirdly, the ADV has to
compromise at least m neighbor nodes of si that stores the corresponding data
shares to recover encrypted data ENtextrˆi (rˆ > rb). Finally, the ADV should
have ability to decrypt the ENtextrˆi to obtain PLtextrˆi by using secret key Krai
obtained in Trp. Therefore, the backward secrecy of si can be compromised by
an ADV , if and only if all Conditions 1, 2, and 3 are satisfied.
Theorem 3.3. The ES provides backward secrecy with probability
PrES = 1− Pr(C1) · Pr(C2) · Pr(C3),
where C1, C2, and C3 refer to Conditions 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and
Pr(C1) is the probability that Condition 1 is satisfied, so do Pr(C2) and
Pr(C3).
Proof. Sketch of proof.
3.4.2.2 ADV_del
Proposition 3.4. MS can recover the original data if the number of failure
message in n is fewer than threshold value n−m. The probability of successful
data recovery as a function of random node failure is
Prrst_mf = 1−
n∑
t=n−m+1
 n
t
Prtmf (1− Prmf )n−t
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where Prmf is the probability that a message has a random failure.
Proof. Let Pr(A), Pr(Bt) represent the probability thatMS cannot recover
the original data due to random node failure, and the probability that t nodes
are failed, respectively. It is easy to see that
Pr(Bt) =
 n
t
Prtmf (1− Prmf )n−t .
Recall that the basic idea of (n,m) Reed-Solomon codes is that the original
data can be reconstructed if at least m data shares are available. In other
words, the original data cannot be reconstructed if t (t ∈ [n−m+ 1, n]) data
shares are not available. That is, Pr(A|Bt) = 1 when t ∈ [n −m + 1, n] and
Pr(A|Bt) = 0 when t ∈ [0, n−m]. We have
Pr(A) =
n∑
t=0
P (Bt)P (A|Bt)
=
n−m∑
t=0
P (Bt)P (A|Bt) +
n∑
t=n−m+1
P (Bt)P (A|Bt)
=
n∑
t=n−m+1
P (Bt)P (A|Bt)
=
n∑
t=n−m+1
 n
t
Prtmf (1− Prmf )n−t .
Therefore we have the probability of successful data recovery as a function of
random node failure
Prrst_mf = Pr(A) = 1− Pr(A)
= 1−
n∑
t=n−m+1
 n
t
Prtmf (1− Prmf )n−t.
Fig. 3.1 shows the analysis results for given (n,m) parameters.
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Figure 3.1: Probability of data recovery due to node random failure.
3.4.2.3 ADV_md
Proposition 3.5. Given Pctm, the percentage of the data shares modified by
ADV_md, the original data can still be reconstructed upon the first retrieval
with a probability
Pr1rcs =
(n(1− Pctm))!(n−m)!
n!(n(1− Pctm)−m)!
where n(1− Pctm) ≥ m.
Proof. The sample space is the total combination of data retrievals, i.e.,
 n
m
.
The event that the original data are successful reconstructed is
Pr1rcs =
 n(1− Pctm)
m
 .
Thus the probability of successful data reconstruction upon the first retrieval
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is
Pr1rcs =
 n(1− Pctm)
m

 n
m

=
(n(1− Pctm))!(n−m)!
n!(n(1− Pctm)−m)! .
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Pctm, percentage of modified data parts
P
r r
c
s
,
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
d
a
ta
re
co
v
er
y
u
p
o
n
th
e
fi
rs
t
re
tr
ie
va
l
 
 
(m,n)=(3,20)
(m,n)=(6,20)
(m,n)=(9,20)
(m,n)=(3,10)
(m,n)=(4,10)
(m,n)=(5,10)
Figure 3.2: Probability of data recovery upon the first retrieval.
Fig. 3.2 depicts the analysis results for given (n,m) parameters.
Finally, Table 3.2 summarizes the comparison results with a few existing
schemes in terms of forward secrecy, backward secrecy, resilient to Node Failure
(RNF) and Resilient to Message Failure (RMF). The results show that ES has
the best performance among these studied schemes.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we propose secure and reliable distributed data storage in
UWSNs by taking advantages of key evolution and Reed-Solomon codes, which
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Table 3.2: Security and performance comparison result among existed work
and proposed schemes in terms of forward secrecy, backward secrecy, RNF,
and RMF.
forward secrecy backward secrecy RNF RMF
DISH [60] Yes Probabilistic No No
POSH [21] Yes Probabilistic No No
Wang et al. [109] Partial Probabilistic Yes Yes
ES Yes Probabilistic Yes Yes
has computational security and yet maintains the optimal data size. The se-
curity analysis shows that ES provides forward secrecy, probabilistic backward
secrecy as well as resiliency to message failure and node failure against Read-
only ADV , ADV_del, and ADV_md attacks.
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Chapter 4
Historical Data Confidentiality
and Reliability
In the previous chapter we proposed and demonstrated that forward secrecy
and data reliability can be provided by using key evolution and data distribu-
tion. However, by these means we could achieve only probabilistic backward
secrecy. In this chapter, we propose a homomorphic encryption and homo-
morphic secret sharing based scheme to provide backward secrecy of historical
data. The historical data includes historical aggregation or locally created
results after data processing, e.g., the average temperature during last three
months; the highest and lowest humidity degree during last 24 hours; or more
specifically, the average concentration of a chemical element in soil during last
half a year [116].
4.1 Network Model, Threat Model, Design Goals
and Evaluation Metrics
In this chapter we continue using the network model and threat model defined
in Subsection 3.2.1 and in Subsection 3.2.2, respectively.
UWSNs paradigm is motivated by scenarios whereby not real-time informa-
tion, but digest information is of interest. Our goal thus is to design a secure
and efficient as well as low storage cost data storage scheme for UWSNs. Fol-
lowing evaluated parameters will be used in the subsequent section.
Recall that dri denotes data value collected by sensor si at round r. Then
{dri}Rr=1 denotes a sequence of data sensed during R rounds. The average value
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can be calculated as
E(di) =
∑R
r=1 d
r
i
R
. (4.1)
The variance of data can be computed as
V ari =
∑R
r=1(d
r
i − E(di))2
R
. (4.2)
Data Survival Probability (DSP ) is the probability of the valid data sur-
vival against the ADV_del and ADV_md.
Our design goal is to maximizeDSP with respect toADV_del andADV_md.
Storage Overhead (SO) is the number of units data memory per node used
in a UWSN given that the network size is fixed.
The design goal is to minimize SO of the proposed scheme. SinceADV_del
and ADV_md do not effect SO, we neglect their effect. In our scheme, we
consider the storage overhead of the whole sensor network rather than a single
sensor node. For example, if a dri generated by a sensor node si at round r is
stored in two sensor nodes si and sj, the SO of dri is 2 ∗ dlog2(dri )e, where dri
is sensed data collected by sensor si at round r.
Transmission Cost (TC) is a value defined as how many units of data
transmitted when sensor nodes distribute sensed data over R rounds and how
many units of data transmitted whenMS retrieves R rounds data.
4.2 The Proposed schemes
In this section, we present a family of schemes for efficient and reliable dis-
tributed data storage. The goal is to increase DSP , decrease SO and TC
while maintaining data confidentiality. We first introduce two naive schemes,
analyze and discuss their weaknesses. Then we present two enhanced schemes
to improve them.
4.2.1 Naive Scheme I: DATA-MOVING
Firstly, we consider Do-Nothing scheme as a baseline, in which no specific
schemes are employed to define attacks. As we mentioned above, ADV_del
and ADV_md would compromise data integrity. Assuming that ADV_del
and ADV_md are independent events, after these attacks, the sensor nodes is
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out of operation. The DSP is:
DSP = 1− Prdel − Prmd,
where Prdel is the probability of ADV_del success, Prmd is the probability of
ADV_md success, and Prdel + Prmd ≤ 1.
In R rounds, the SO caused by si is: SO =
∑R
r=1 dlog2(dri )e. Since log2(dri )
is stored locally at si, thus TC of distributing data are equal to 0. TC of
retrieving data are equal to
∑R
r=1 dlog2(dri )e.
The authors in [23] proposed a Data-Moving scheme which can protect
certain specified data from ADV_del. More specifically, the Data-Moving
scheme has two strategies: MOVING-ONCE and KEEP-MOVING. As their
names suggest, KEEP-MOVING enables data moving between sensors in each
round, whereas MOVING-ONCE makes data moving from the sensor it gen-
erated to another sensor, and staying there until theMS’s retrieval. Keeping
data moving makes ADV_del difficult to find and locate the sensor in which
the specified data stored. As the data move once in each round, however,
KEEP-MOVING scheme causes very large TC, where
TC =
R∑
j=1
j∑
r=1
dlog2(dri )e+
R∑
r=1
dlog2(dri )e .
Computation of expected value and variance. To compute expected value
and variance, theMS needs to retrieve plaintext data d1i , · · · , dri , · · · , dRi from
si. Then the expected value and variance can be computed easily according
to Eq. (4.1) and Eq. (4.2).
Proposition 4.1. The MOVING-ONCE and KEEP-MOVING scheme have
the same DSP and SO as the Do-Nothing scheme in presence of ADV_del
and ADV_md.
Proof. (sketch) Since each new sensed data are KEEP-MOVING in the UWSN,
each sensor node should keep several data at a certain time. If a sensor node is
compromised, the data moved to this node is also compromised. Thus, for the
whole network, the volume of data compromised by ADV_del is the same as
in the scheme MOVING-ONCE and KEEP-MOVING. Therefore, the DSP is
the same. The new sensed data is just moved to neighbors in the MOVING-
ONCE and KEEP-MOVING scheme. Thus, the SO of MOVING-ONCE and
that of KEEP-MOVING scheme are the same as Do-Nothing scheme.
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Proposition 4.2. DATA-MOVING scheme provides neither forward secrecy
nor backward secrecy.
Proof. The basic idea of DATA-MOVING scheme is to protect some specified
data from ADV . Even data are not encrypted in the DATA-MOVING scheme,
keeping the data moving in each round makes it for ADV difficult to find them.
However our goal is to provide forward secrecy and backward secrecy of all
the data. Once sensors are compromised in DATA-MOVING scheme, all the
data stored in them are revealed. Thus the DATA-MOVING scheme provides
neither forward secrecy nor backward secrecy.
4.2.2 Naive Scheme II: Data Redundancy Based Scheme
As discussed in the previous subsection, DATA-MOVING scheme does not
improve DSP and SO, and even increases TC. To improve DSP , we can
use data redundancy policy, in which the data are stored locally and their
copy is sent to the neighbors. If a sensor node is physically destroyed (or data
modified) by ADV_del (or ADV_md),MS can retrieve the copy of original
data from the neighbors of sensors. Therefore, better data reliability will be
achieved. Note that storing data replica on neighbor nodes increases DSP ,
however, increases SO of the whole network.
To solve this problem, the authors in [109] proposed a Reed-Solomon codes
and Secret Sharing based scheme (RSSS). Since both (n,m) secret sharing
scheme and (n, k) Reed-Solomon codes can divide data into n shares (m <
n, k < n), any combination more than m (or k) can reconstruct the original
data. In other words, even some data shares stored in neighbor nodes are
physically destroyed (or modified) by ADV_del (or ADV_md),MS still can
recover the original data if more than m shares are available. The advantage
of (n,m) secret sharing scheme is that it can provide high level security, where
any combination of less than m secret shares cannot reveal the secret. The
weak point of the scheme is that the size of each encoded data share is still
the same as the size of original data. Compared with secret sharing scheme,
the size of each share encoded by (n, k) Reed-Solomon codes is 1/n of original
data, which is much smaller than the size of shares in secret sharing schemes.
However, Reed-Solomon codes cannot provide security as secret sharing scheme
does.
Combining the advantages of both Reed-Solomon codes and secret sharing
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scheme, a hybrid scheme was proposed, in which data dri sensed in round
r are split into n data shares by (k, n) Reed-Solomon codes denoted as
ptri,1, pt
r
i,2, · · · , ptri,n, and secret key is divided into n shares by (m, n) secret
sharing scheme denoted as Sri,1, Sri,2, · · · , Sri,n. The sensor si then randomly
selects n neighbor nodes from NBi and sends the ptri,t and Sri,t to them. To
recover the original data,MS only needs to retrieve at least m shares of data
and k secret key shares. Thus, RSSS reduces the SO and provides certain
data reliability.
Discussion. We observe that RSSS has the following weaknesses.
• To retrieve data generated in R rounds,MS has to retrieve data R times
from a sensor node that stores R rounds data. The sensor node can also
pack R rounds data into one packet, and send it toMS. However, the
length of the packet is still R ∗ dlog2(dri )e. This will increase TC as well.
• The encrypted data shares EncKri (ptri,t) which are generated by si during
r rounds still need storage cost r ∗ ⌈log2(EncKri (ptri,t))⌉ in neighbor node
sj, where Kri is the secret key of si during round r. As r increases, the
SO increases too.
• RSSS provides neither forward secrecy nor backward secrecy.
From discussion above, we have the following observations. Before MS re-
trieves the data, the sensor si generates R rounds data. So the storage cost
of encrypted data in sensor memory can be denoted as
∑R
r=1 dlog2(dri )e. If
the value R tends to be large, e.g., 1000000, the storage cost will increase
dramatically. Since our goal is to get expected value and variance of data, we
transform Eq. (4.2) as following:
V ari =
∑R
r=1(d
r
i )
2
R
−
(∑R
r=1 d
r
i
R
)2
=
∑R
r=1(d
r
i )
2
R
− (
∑R
r=1 d
r
i )
2
R2
(4.3)
Given SumRi =
∑R
r=1 d
r
i and SumSquareRi =
∑R
r=1(d
r
i )
2, Eq. (4.1) and Eq. (4.3)
can be further denoted as
E(di) =
SumRi
R
, (4.4)
and
V ari =
SumSquareRi
R
− (Sum
R
i )
2
R2
. (4.5)
36 Security Mechanisms in Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks
In other words, to computeE(di) and V ari,MS needs to get SumRi , SumSquareRi ,
and R instead. Note that the storage cost of sensors can be largely reduced if
SumRi and SumSquareRi are stored, instead of storing the encryption of data
generated in each rounds.
Moreover, we observe that if the sensor keeps the secret unchanging, all
encrypted data can be read by ADV , no matter the data are generated before
or after the compromised period, since it only needs to compromise the sensor
once and gets the secret key consequently. Thus, these observations motivate
us to design next scheme that can reduce storage cost and provide both forward
secrecy and backward secrecy.
4.2.3 Homomorphic Encryption and Key Evolution Based
Scheme (HKS)
Let Kri be the secret key of sensor si in round r. To deal with the limitations in
RSSS, we need to change the secret key after each round to guarantee that the
ADV who holds the secret key Kri in compromised period r ∈ [ra, rb] cannot
derive the secret key Krˆi in the previous rounds rˆ ∈ [0, ra). We utilize key
evolution approach [6], i.e., the secret key of a sensor node is updated by its
owner. The secret key of si in round r is computed as Kri = h(Kr−1i ), where
h(·) is an one-way hash function (Kr−1i is then securely erased.). After the
secret key Kri is updated by si at the end of round r, ADV cannot derive
the previous round’s key before the sensor was compromised (due to one-way
property of h(·)). Moreover,MS can easily compute the corresponding secret
key of sensor si in round r for Kri = hr−1(Ki) = hr−1(Km||i). Here, || stands
for the concatenation operator.
In addition, we utilize additive homomorphic encryption [14] to encrypt
new sensed data such that sum of encrypted data (denoted as SumEnc =∑R
r=1Enc(d
r
i )) corresponds to encryption of those data summation (denoted
as EncSum = Enc(
∑R
r=1 d
r
i )). To encrypt a data dri , the sensor si do
Enc(dri ) = Enc(d
r
i ,Kri ,M) = dri +Kri (modM),
where dri ∈ [0,M−1] andM is a large integer. Due to the properties of additive
homomorphic encryption, we can obtain Enc(
∑R
r=1 d
r
i ) =
∑R
r=1Enc(d
r
i ) and
Enc(
∑R
r=1(d
r
i )
2) =
∑R
r=1Enc((d
r
i )
2). Thus EncSum and EncSumSquare =
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Enc(
∑R
r=1(d
r
i )
2) can be obtained by
EncSum = Enc(
R∑
r=1
dri ) =
R∑
r=1
Enc(dri ) = SumEnc,
and
EncSumSquare = Enc(
R∑
r=1
(dri )
2) =
R∑
r=1
Enc((dri )
2) = SumEncSquare.
To decrypt theEncSum = Enc(
∑R
r=1 d
r
i ) and EncSumSquare = Enc(
∑R
r=1(d
r
i )
2,
similar to Eq. (4.6) and Eq. (4.7), after computing the corresponding secret key
as
∑R
r=1Kri =
∑R
r=1 h
r−1(Km||i),MS can get SumEnc =
∑R
r=1Enc(d
r
i ) and
SumEncSquare =
∑R
r=1Enc((d
r
i )
2) as following
Sum = Dec(EncSum) = Dec(SumEnc)
= Dec(
R∑
r=1
Enc(dri ))
=
R∑
r=1
Enc(dri )−
R∑
r=1
Kri (mod M)
=
R∑
r=1
dri (4.6)
and
SumS = Dec(EncSumSquare) = Dec(SumEncSquare)
= Dec(
R∑
r=1
Enc((dri )
2))
=
R∑
r=1
Enc((dri )
2)−
R∑
r=1
Kri (mod M ′)
=
R∑
r=1
(dri )
2, (4.7)
where (dri )2 ∈M ′ and M ′ is a large integer.
Algorithm 1 shows the homomorphic encryption and decryption operation
process in sensor si. For more detailed information about homomorphic en-
cryption, please refer to Section 2.4.
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Algorithm 1: Homomorphic encryption and Key evolution based
Scheme
Input : dri
Output: EncSumri , EncSumSquareri
1 /* sensor si starts round r. */;
2 collect new sensed data dri ;
3 compute Enc(dri ) = Enc(dri ,Ki,M) = dri +Ki (mod M);
4 compute Enc((dri )2) = Enc((dri )2,Ki,M ′) = (dri )2 +Ki (mod M ′);
5 if r = 1 then
6 SumEncri = Enc(d
r
i );
7 SumEncSquareri = Enc((d
r
i )
2);
8 else
9 compute SumEncri ← SumEncr−1i + Enc(dri );
10 compute SumEncSquareri ← SumEncSquarer−1i + Enc((dri )2);
11 end
12 store SumEncri , SumEncSquareri on local storage;
13 /* end round r. */;
Computation of expected value and variance. AfterMS retrieves the SumEnc
and SumEncSquare, it can decrypt them by Eq. (4.6) and Eq. (4.7) to get
Sum and SumSquare using the corresponding secret key
∑R
r=1Kri . Then, the
expected value and variance can be easily computed by Eq. (4.4) and Eq. (4.5).
Proposition 4.3. The storage cost of SumRi and SumSquareRi is lower than
storing the encryptions of data generated in each rounds, if R > 1 and log2(dmax) >
1, where dmax = MAX(dri ).
Proof. The storage cost of SumRi and SumSquareRi can be denoted as
log2(SumSquare
R
i ) + log2(Sum
R
i )
= log2
( R∑
r=1
(dri )
2
)
+ log2
( R∑
r=1
dri )
)
≤ log2(R ∗ (dmax)2) + log2(R ∗ dmax)
= log2R + 2log2(dmax) + log2R + log2(dmax)
= 2log2R + 3log2(dmax) .
The storage cost of the encryptions of data generated in each rounds can
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be denoted as
R∑
r=1
log2((d
r
i )
2) +
R∑
r=1
log2(d
r
i )
= 2
R∑
r=1
log2(d
r
i ) +
R∑
r=1
log2(d
r
i )
= 3
R∑
r=1
log2(d
r
i )
≤ 3Rlog2(dmax) .
When R > 1 and log2(dmax) > 1, 3Rlog2(dmax)−2log2R−3log2(dmax) > 0.
Therefore, we have
log2(SumSquare
R
i ) + log2(Sum
R
i ) <
R∑
r=1
log2((d
r
i )
2) +
R∑
r=1
log2(d
r
i ),
if R > 1 and log2(dmax) > 1.
In UWSN, given that R tends to a very large value, e.g., 1000000, and
dlog2(dri )e is a fixed small value, the storage cost is reduced significantly (as
shown in Fig. 4.1) if SumRi and SumSquareRi are stored instead. Thus, these
results motivate us to design a data summation scheme that can reduce storage
cost.
Proposition 4.4. HKS can provide forward secrecy as well as backward se-
crecy.
Proof. Since key evolution is adopted in HKS, the ADV cannot derive the
previous key from the current key it holds due to the one way property of hash
function, thus the ADV cannot decrypt the data encrypted in previous rounds,
which means the forward secrecy is guaranteed. Moreover, the data generated
in previous rounds are stored as SumEnc and SumEncSquare in sensor nodes.
To decrypt them, the corresponding secret key
∑R
r=1Kri is needed, which con-
sists of all keys generated in each round. Since the previous keys cannot be
derived from current key, the corresponding key
∑R
r=1Kri cannot be obtained
by ADV , that means backward secrecy is guaranteed. Therefore, HKS can
guarantee both forward secrecy and backward secrecy.
Discussion. As UWSNs operate in unattended environment, sensor nodes
may fail due to various reasons such as battery depletion, natural disaster,
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random failure, etc. Once a sensor loses its functionality totally, all the data it
has stored cannot be retrieved byMS. To provide data reliability, we propose
the scheme in the following subsection.
4.2.4 Homomorphic Encryption and Homomorphic Se-
cret Sharing Based Scheme (HEHSS)
We observe that HKS can provide both forward secrecy and backward secrecy
as well as low SO and TC, but cannot guarantee data reliability.
Next we propose a Homomorphic Encryption and Homomorphic Secret
Sharing based scheme (HEHSS). It takes the advantage of both RSSS and
HKS for providing both forward secrecy and backward secrecy as well as
keeping low SO, TC, and DSP (reliability).
The scheme contains following steps:
Step 1: System initialization. Initially, the sink picks a secret key
denoted as Km. A sensor node si initiates a round index r to 1, as well as
shares a secret key K1i with the sink. The K1i = h(Km||i) is originally derived
from the secret key Km by using a hash function h. The round index r and
the encryption key Kri are updated after each round, i.e., r ← r + 1, and
Kri = h(Kr−1i ). Thus, the sink only needs to store a single secret key Km and
secret key Kri for each round can be derived as needed.
Step 2: Distributed data storage. si employs (n,m) homomorphic
secret sharing scheme to split dri into n shares, denoted as Sri,1, Sri,2, ..., Sri,n,
secondly selects n neighbors in NBi based on node selection scheme addressed
in Chapter 5, and finally distributes randomly share Sri,t to sj by using current
Kri to encrypt the packet.
si 7→ sj : {EncKri (Sri,t), r, i}, t ∈ [1, n],
where EncKri (S
r
i,t) = S
r
i,t +Kri (modM).
In contrast to the data storage in scheme RSSS [109], sj adds the encrypted
shares EncKri (S
r
i,t) to previously received shares
∑R
r=1EncKr−1i (S
r−1
i,t ), when sj
receives {EncKri (Sri,t), r, i} from si. For the purpose of comparison, Table 4.1
shows the differences between data storage in RSSS andHEHSS. We observe
thatHEHSS can store encrypted data generated during R rounds into a single
memory unit, which drastically reduces SO. Furthermore, MS only needs
to retrieve a data block {∑EncKRi (SRi,t), R, i}, when it periodically visits the
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Algorithm 2: Calculate y =
∑R
r=1 d
r
i = Sum
Require: m ≥ 0
Sri,1, S
r
i,2, · · · , Sri,n ⇐ HSSEncode(dri )
Ensure :
∑R
r=1 d
r
i = Sum
EncSumSquaret = SumEncSquaret, t ∈ [1, n]
EncSum←
HSSRecover(EncSumSquareri,1, · · · , EncSumSquareri,m),
Sum← Dec(EncSum)
UWSN and retrieves data. Therefore, HEHSS also reduces TC.
Step 3: Data reconstruction. MS collects m shares from nodes and
reconstructs data using homomorphic secret sharing scheme and homomorphic
encryption. Algorithm 2 briefly describes the algorithm executed atMS when
receiving sum of encrypted shares (the sum of data square can be obtained by
using the same procedure).
Theorem 4.5. In HEHSS,MS can reconstruct the data correctly.
Proof. (Sketch) The homomorphic encryption can also be combined with ho-
momorphic secret sharing, e.g., there are an operation ⊕ on the shares, and
an operation ⊗ on the encrypted shares such that for all participants
EncKri (S
r
i,t)⊗ EncKri (Sri,t′) = EncKri (Sri,t ⊕ Sri,t′)
Thus by decrypting the encrypted data shares EncKri (S
r
i,t)⊗ EncKri (Sri,t′), the
recovered secret will be equal to Sri,t ⊕ Sri,t′ , assuming that the underlying
secret sharing scheme is ⊕ homomorphic.
Remarks : Our scheme can be customized via concrete secret sharing scheme
Table 4.1: Difference of data storage between RSSS and HEHSS
{EncK1i (S
1
i,t), 1, i}
...
{EncKri (Sri,t), r, i} {
∑
EncKRi (S
R
i,t), R, i}
...
{EncKRi (S
R
i,t), R, i}
Data storage in RSSS [109] Data storage in HEHSS
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and encryption schemes according to the design requirements. Normally, any
additive homomorphic secret sharing schemes can be combined with additive
homomorphic encryption schemes.
4.3 Analysis and Numerical Results
In this section, we investigate numeric performance of the proposed schemes
with respect to ADV_del and ADV_md.
Table 4.2 illustrates the quantitative performance analysis in terms of SO,
TC, and DSP . Fig. 4.1~Fig. 4.4 show analytical results in Table 4.2 in terms
of SO, TC, and DSP , where n,m, k are defined as in Section 4.2.
4.3.1 Performance Evaluation
4.3.1.1 SO Analysis
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Figure 4.1: The SO comparison between proposed schemes for n = 10,m =
k = 6, and |Enc(dri )| = 64 bits.
In RSSS, sensor sends n data shares to n neighbors, which costs SORSSS =
n
k
∑R
r=1 |Enc(dri )|. In HKS, the sum of encrypted data and the sum of en-
crypted data squares are stored, which significantly reduce the storage cost,
e.g., SO = |∑Rr=1Enc(dri )| + |∑Rr=1Enc(dri )2|. Since HKS cannot provide
data reliability, HEHSS improves theHKS by encoding the sum of encrypted
data and then sending the encoded shares to neighbor nodes to increase DSP ,
leading to SO increased slightly.
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As shown in Fig. 4.1, the y-axis represents the storage overhead in the whole
UWSN. We can observe that RSSS causes higher SO than the other three
schemes. Due to the property of homomorphic encryption and homomorphic
secret sharing, HKS can store received data share in one data block of size
dlog2Me bits, as shown in Table 4.1. Thus, HKS has the lowest SO among
those schemes, and keeps the SO in a very low level. HEHSS increases DSP
and the cost of SO more than HKS.
4.3.1.2 TC Analysis
Compared with other three schemes, BS causes very large TC, when data are
KEEP-MOVING at each round.
In RSSS, sensor node si needs to send n encoded data share |ptri,t| to
selected neighbor nodes sj, sj ∈ NBi. Due to the property of Reed-Solomon
codes, the size of encoded share is 1/k of the original data. Thus, |ptri,t| =
1
k
log2(d
r
i ). In addition,MS accesses the UWSN periodically to retrieve sensed
data in R rounds. To reconstruct a data packet, the mobile node only needs
to retrieve k data shares. That is,
TCRSSS = (n+ k) ∗
R∑
r=1
|ptri,t|
=
n+ k
k
R∑
r=1
|Enc(dri )|, t ∈ [1, · · · , n].
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Figure 4.2: The TC comparison between proposed schemes, with n = 10,m =
k = 6, and |Enc(dri )| = 64 bits.
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In HEHSS, sensor node si also needs to send n encrypted data share |Sri,t|
to selected neighbor nodes sj, sj ∈ NBi. To retrieve data sensed in R round,
MS only needs to retrieve compressed block from m neighbor nodes. Due to
the property of (n,m) secret sharing, the size of encoded data share equals the
size of original data share, |Sri,t| = |Enc(dri )|. That is,
TCHEHSS = (n+m)|
R∑
r=1
Sri,t|
= (n+m)(|
R∑
r=1
Enc(dri )|+ |
R∑
r=1
Enc((dri )
2)|), t ∈ [1, · · · , n].
As shown in Fig. 4.2, we observe that the TC for other three schemes is almost
0 when they compared with BS. Therefore in Fig. 4.3, we ignore the TC of
BS, and plot only RSSS, HKS and HEHSS. We can observe that HKS
and HEHSS have the lowest TC for these three schemes.
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of TC for RSSS, HKS and HEHSS, when n =
10,m = k = 6, and |Enc(dri )| = 64 bits.
4.3.1.3 DSP Analysis
For RSSS and HEHSS, if m = k, both (n, k) Reed-Solomon codes and
(n,m) secret sharing scheme need to get m(or k) data shares to reconstruct
data. Thus, they have the same effect on DSP . As shown in Fig. 4.4, BS and
HKS, which cannot provide data reliability, have the worst result where the
DSP tends to 0 when Prdel + Prmd → 1. The DSP of RSSS and HEHSS
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is still 1 even if the Prdel + Prmd is up to 0.4. When Prdel + Prmd > 0.4, the
DSP of RSSS and HEHSS tends to 0 because the number of survival data
shares is not enough to reconstruct the original data.
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of DSP for RSSS, HKS and HEHSS, when n =
10,m = k = 6.
4.3.2 Security Analysis
For BS, secret may be revealed if nodes stored the original data or data replica
are compromised by attackers . Compared with BS, RSSS provides better
security because attackers only get encoded data shares when a node is com-
promised. However, ADV who got more than k shares still can recover the
original data. Once ADV obtains the secret key, it can decrypt all the data.
Since key evolution is adopted in the HKS and HEHSS, ADV cannot derive
the previous key from the current key it holds due to the one way property
of hash function. Thus ADV cannot decrypt the data encrypted in previ-
ous rounds, which means that forward secrecy is guaranteed. Furthermore,
the data generated in the previous rounds are stored as sum of encrypted data
and sum of encrypted data squares. To decrypt them, the corresponding secret
key
∑R
r=1Kri is needed, which consists of all keys generated in each rounds.
Since the previous keys cannot be derived from the current key, the corre-
sponding key
∑R
r=1Kri cannot be obtained by ADV , meaning that backward
secrecy is guaranteed. For (n,m) homomorphic secret sharing scheme, getting
fewer than m shares cannot be used to reconstruct the secret. Therefore, even
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if some sensor nodes are compromised, ADV still cannot retrieve the data
without having enough shares.
Finally, we summarize the comparison results between BS, RSSS, HKS,
andHEHSS in Table 4.3 in terms of forward secrecy, backward secrecy, DSP ,
SO, and TC. Table 4.3 shows the conclusion that HEHSS has the best
performance compared with other three schemes in terms of forward secrecy,
backward secrecy, DSP , SO, and TC.
Table 4.3: Performance comparison results between different schemes.
Scheme forward secrecy&backward secrecy Reliability (DSP) SO TC
BS No Low High Very High
RSSS No High High High
HKS Yes Low Low Low
HEHSS Yes High Low Low
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a novel homomorphic encryption and ho-
momorphic secret sharing based scheme for efficient and reliable distributed
data storage suitable for UWSNs. Compared with the schemes proposed in
Chapter 3, we demonstrated that backward secrecy of historical data can be
achieved. Detailed analysis and numerical results demonstrate that our scheme
accomplishes the goals of forward secrecy, backward secrecy, resilience to node
compromises, reliability, and efficiency of storage and transmission.
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Chapter 5
Optimized Data Distribution
The previous two chapters present data distribution schemes (i.e., ES and
HEHSS) to provide data reliability. These schemes allow sensors to distribute
generated data to a subset of their neighbor nodes, which would allow MS
to retrieve data successfully even when certain amount of data are deleted or
modified by ADV . The next question we need to answer is how to select a
suitable subset of nodes to store data.
In this chapter we further improve ES and HEHSS by using a constrained
optimization data distribution scheme. Through extensive simulations, we
demonstrate that our scheme achieves significant performance improvement
over the benchmark scheme [109].
5.1 Optimized Data Distribution Scheme (ODDS)
In this section we try to describe how to select suitable sensor nodes to store
data. Generally speaking, various metrics can be selected, such as battery level
based, storage capability based, and security level based, etc. In this study we
aim at improving backward secrecy and data reliability of the data distribution
schemes proposed in the previous two chapters. The security level is chosen as
our selection metric.
5.1.1 Problem Formulation
The basic idea of ODDS is that sensor si selects top n security level neighbors
in its neighbor set NBi to distribute its data. Inspired by a routing path
49
50 Security Mechanisms in Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks
selection algorithm from [55], we assume each node, si, has a probability vector
PV i = {Pi,j}nbij=1 that reflects the security levels of its neighbor nodes in NBi,
where Pi,j is the probability that si,j, a neighbor node of si, is compromised
in time interval T . Here, Pi,j could be evaluated from the feedback of certain
security monitoring software and/or assigned manually by theMS based on
sensor’s physical protection level, the location, or the role of the sensor. For
example, the nodes buried under the ground have higher security level (lower
Pi,j) than the nodes exposed, or the nodes deployed in enemy field would have
lower security level (higher Pi,j). Without loss of generality, we further assume
that Pi,1 ≤ Pi,2 ≤ · · · ≤ Pi,nbi , meaning that the security levels are ordered
from high to low.
Given a probability threshold value PTi, si can select ti qualified neighbor
nodes that have lower probability of being compromised than the threshold
value PTi, denoted as set NBqlf_i = {si,1, si,2, · · · , si,ti}, where Pi,1 ≤ Pi,2 ≤
· · · ≤ Pi,ti ≤ PTi. Then, the data distribution scheme of si can be reformulated
as a constrained optimization problem:
Minimize Prrecov(m,n)
Subject to Pi,j ≤ PTi
where Prrecov(n,m) is the probability that the original data is compromised
by an ADV . Given a redundancy factor τ = n
m
of the (n,m) Reed-Solomon
codes, the data distribution scheme can be divided into two classes depending
on the value of τ , i.e., τ = 1 and τ > 1, which causes the tradeoff between
maximum security and data reliability. We address them as follows.
5.1.2 Maximum Security without Redundancy (τ = 1)
To provide maximum security, in other words, minimize Prrecov(n,m), the
data distribution scheme must force the ADV to compromise all the qualified
data holders as m = n. In the data distribution scheme, si encodes data into
n = ti shares and distributes them to the ti qualified neighbor nodes from
NBqlf_i. The Prrecov(n,m) is thus equal to the probability that all ti nodes
are compromised,
Prrecov(m,n) =
t∏
j=1
Pi,j . (5.1)
We can observe that the higher the number of qualified neighbor nodes, the
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lower the Prrecov(n,m). However, too many ti may cause large storage and
communication overhead. Given a required security level λi, and considering
storage overhead and communication overhead, si can choose the top n =
t′i(t
′
i ≤ ti) security level nodes, which satisfies Prrecov(n,m) =
∏t′i
j=1 Pi,j ≤ λi
to distribute the data.
Discussion: When τ = 1, ODDS is able to provide maximum security,
but it is not resilient to node failure and message failure. If one node loses
functionality, or one data share is not delivered, the original data cannot be
recovered. Under certain conditions (to be explained in Section 5.3), it may
cause low data reliability in case when data shares are distributed to low
security level nodes. Moreover, in practical networks, sensors may stop working
due to node crash, and messages cannot always be delivered. Therefore, it is
necessary to add redundancy to provide data reliability.
5.1.3 Maximum Security with Redundancy (τ > 1)
To provide data redundancy, we must have m < n, encoded by a (n,m) Reed-
Solomon codes. When m < n, if α (α ≤ n−m) data shares are corrupted or
lost, the original data can still be recovered. Note that the higher the τ the
more reliable the data scheme, but the easier for ADV to recover the data.
The tradeoff is thus, given a required redundancy threshold, e.g., τ < 1 + 2
ti
1,
how to distribute data shares among nodes that satisfy the required security
level in order to obtain the maximum security while having the maximum data
reliability. A sensor, si, splits data into n = ti shares and distributes them to ti
qualified neighbor nodes from NBqlf_i. Considering that the data redundancy
is upper-bounded by τ < 1 + 2
ti
, to maximize the data reliability, m can be
chosen as
m >
nt
t+ 2
. (5.2)
Thus, it is easy to see that ENtext can be recovered by the ADV , only if
the ADV compromised at least m nodes in {si,1, si,2, · · · , si,n}, which has the
probability
m∏
j=1
Pi,j 6 Prrecov 6
n∏
j=n−m
Pi,j . (5.3)
To reduce storage overhead and communication overhead, si can choose
the top n = t′i(t′i ≤ ti) security level nodes, which satisfies Prrecov(n,m) =
1Here, the given redundancy threshold could be any value larger than 1.
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∏t′i
j=1 Pi,j ≤ λi to distribute the data, for a given required security level λi.
5.1.4 A Numerical Example
We give a simple example to demonstrate how the node selection scheme works.
For simplicity, we assume that a sensor, s9, has 7 neighbor nodes, denoted as
NB9 = {s9,1, s9,2, · · · , s9,7}, with PV9 = {5%, 5%, 10%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%}.
Given a threshold value PT9 = 25%, it is easy to select the qualified nodes as
set NBqlf_9 = {s9,1, s9,2, · · · , s9,5}. At round 8, s9 generates data d89, encrypts
it into ENtext89, encodes ENtext89 into n = t9 = 5 shares, distributes these 5
shares to all the 5 nodes in NBqlf_9. It then follows the steps below depending
on τ .
1. τ = 1. Sincem = n = 5, it forces the ADV to compromise all the 5 nodes
to recover the ENtext89 with probability Prrecov(5, 5) =
∏5
j=1 Pi,j = 5% ·
5% ·10% ·10% ·20% = 0.0005%. To compromise the BSe of s9, the ADV
has to recover ENtext89. On the other hand, it has to compromise s9 to
get the key secret to decrypt the ENtext89. Assuming P9 = 20% is the
probability of s9 of being compromised by the ADV , the probability of
BSe of s9 to be compromised is PrBSe_comp = P9·Prrecov(5, 5) = 0.0001%.
2. τ > 1. Based on Eq. (5.2), m should be chosen as m = 4 (m > 25
7
).
If 1 (n −m = 1) data share is corrupted or lost, the ENtext89 can still
be recovered. The ADV has to compromise at least 4 nodes to recover
the ENtext89 with probability 0.0025% ≤ Prrecov(4, 5) ≤ 0.01%. Given
P9 = 20%, the BSe of s9 to be compromised is 0.0005% ≤ PrBSe_comp ≤
0.002%.
5.2 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security aspects of ODDS.
5.2.1 Security Analysis
Theorem 5.1. Let PTi be a probability threshold, τ be the redundancy factor
and Pi be the probability of si to be compromised in time interval T . If Condi-
tions 1-3 of Lemma 3.2 are satisfied then the probability PrBaS_comp that the
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ADV compromises the backward secrecy of si is as following:
PrBaS_comp = 0 , k < m∏m
j=1 Pi,jPi 6 PrBaS_comp 6
∏n
j=n−m Pi,jPi , k > m, τ < 1, Pi,j ≤ PTi
PrBaS_comp =
∏t
j=1 Pi,jPi , k > m, τ = 1, Pi,j ≤ PTi .
Proof. Since an ADV can compromise backward secrecy only if the ADV can
compromise si to get its secret key Kri and compromise at least its m neighbor
nodes that store the data shares to recover the ENtextri , the ADV thus can
use Kri to decrypt the ENtextri to get the PLtextri . As proved in Lemma 3.2,
one can see that
PrBaS_comp = Pr(C 1) · Pr(C 2) · Pr(C 3) ,
where C1, C2 and C3 refer to Condition 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
Case 1 : k < m. That is Pr(C 2) = 0. The ADV does not have the ability
to compromise at least m sensors within MS’s visiting interval. Thus, it
cannot recover ENtextri . Hence, it cannot compromise the backward secrecy,
i.e., PrBaS_comp = 0.
Case 2 : k > m, τ < 1, i.e., Pr(C 2) = 1. The ADV has the ability to get
enough data shares to recover ENtextri . Given a threshold probability PTi,
the probability Prrecov is computed in Eq. (5.3). Thus,
PrBaS_comp = Pr(C 1) · Pr(C 2) · Pr(C 3)
= Pr(C 1) · 1 · Pr(C 3)
= Pi · Prrecov ,
that is
m∏
j=1
Pi,jPi ≤ PrBaS_comp ≤
n∏
j=n−m
Pi,jPi .
Case 3 : k > m, τ < 1, i.e., Pr(C 2) = 1. Similar to Case 2, given a PTi,
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the probability Prrecov is computed in Eq. (5.1). Thus,
PrBaS_comp = Pr(C 1) · Pr(C 2) · Pr(C 3)
= Pr(C 1) · 1 · Pr(C 3)
= Pi · Prrecov
=
t∏
j=1
Pi,jPi .
5.3 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we show a comparison between the results obtained through a
custom-built simulator we developed using MATLAB.
Consider a UWSN where 200 nodes are randomly distributed in a 500m by
500m area. Each sensor node has a transmission range equaling to TR = 60m.
The simulation results are averaged over 100 randomly deployed networks. As
one snapshot of the network topology shown in Fig. 5.1, nodes are divided
into four sets with different compromise probability Pi: 20% of nodes with
probability Pi = 50%; 30% of nodes with Pi = 40%; 30% of nodes with Pi
= 20%; and 20% of nodes with Pi = 10%, respectively. Table 5.1 shows the
detailed simulation parameter configuration.
The probability threshold values of ODDS are set as PTi = 15%, 30% and
45%, respectively. The probability threshold value PTi introduces that node
with Pi > PTi is considered too risky to allocate data shares and would not be
selected based on node selection scheme. The required security level is set as
λi = 0.1%. Based on the specified PTi, sensors are divided into two categories:
qualified sensors and disqualified sensors. When PTi = 15%, only 20% sensors
are qualified. Whereas 50% sensors and 80% sensors are qualified when PTi
is specified to 30% and 45% respectively. We will analyze later the impact of
PTi based on the simulation results.
Since both [60] and [21] are operated in ideal network without node and
message failure, we conduct simulations to compare data local storage schemes
(i.e., NS, AS, HKS) and RSSS [109] with optimized data distribution scheme,
ODDS improved based on ES and HEHSS. In addition, since the authors
in RSSS [109] did not address how to specify n and m, to compare with the
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ODDS, we set the RSSS [109] having the same n and m with the ODDS. The
simulation results are divided into two classes depending on the redundancy
factor τ .
Table 5.1: Simulation parameter configuration.
Area 500m * 500m
N 200 nodes
Ratio 20% 30% 30% 20%
Pi 50% 40% 20% 10%
Transmission range 60m
0 500
500
Network Topology: 
200 sensor nodes: 20% red nodes, 30% blue nodes, 30% black nodes, 20% green nodes.
with different compromise probability: red=50%,blue=40%,black=20%,green=10%.
X
Y
Figure 5.1: Network topology. 200 sensor nodes: 20% red nodes, 30% blue
nodes, 30% black nodes, 20% green nodes. With different compromise proba-
bility: red = 50%, blue = 40%, black = 20%, green = 10%.
5.3.1 Maximum Security without Redundancy (τ = 1)
Fig. 5.2 shows the simulation results of ODDS with maximum security without
redundancy (discussed in Subsection 5.1.2).
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5.3.1.1 Impacts of PTi
The simulation results with respect to PTi = 15%, 30% and 45% are depicted
as the first column, the second column and the third column of Fig. 5.2, re-
spectively. The performances of NS, AS and HKS are almost the same no
matter PTi is specified. The reason is that NS, AS and HKS are not designed
to distribute data based on PTi.
The first row and the third row of Fig. 5.2 show the simulation results of
the probability of BSe to be compromised PrBSe_comp in terms of node in-
dex and the number of neighbor nodes nbi, respectively. We observe that
the scheme in [109] and ODDS have much lower PrBSe_comp than NS, AS
and HKS. The reason is that data distribution makes ADV harder to com-
promise BSe. Moreover, we also observer that PrBSe_comp decreases as PTi
increases. This is because only 20% nodes can be selected as qualified nodes
when PTi = 15%. Consequently each qualified node has to store more data
shares than the qualified nodes in scenarios with PTi = 30% and PTi = 45%.
In other words, although data shares are distributed to low risk nodes with
low PTi, fewer qualified nodes result in that ADV obtains more data shares
if one data holder node is compromised leading to higher PrBSe_comp. The
simulation results show that ODDS has the lowest PrBSe_comp among them,
demonstrating optimized data distribution works.
The second row and the forth row of Fig. 5.2 depict the simulation re-
sults of the probability of data reliability with respect to node index and nbi.
The simulation results show that increasing PTi leads to worse performance
(probability of data reliability decreasing). This observation coincides with
the discussion in Subsection 5.1.2 (maximum security without redundancy),
meaning that the original data cannot be recovered if one data share is lost,
and data reliability would decrease due to low security level of the data holder.
This shows that adding data redundancy is important.
5.3.1.2 Impacts of nbi
The number of neighbor nodes, nbi, may be different from node to node. This
is why the simulation results are shown as waves in the first row and the sec-
ond row of Fig. 5.2. To further investigate the impact of nbi on PrBSe_comp
and the probability of data reliability, the simulation results are illustrated in
the third row and the forth row of Fig. 5.2. We observe that the performance
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of PrBSe_comp gets better (PrBSe_comp decreasing) as nbi increases. Whereas,
the performance of the probability of data reliability becomes worse (the prob-
ability of data reliability decreasing) as nbi increases. These observations also
coincide with the discussion in Subsection 5.1.2, which is another evidence that
confirms the discussion. We will show later that the probability of data relia-
bility of ODDS is improved significantly due to providing data redundancy.
5.3.2 Maximum Security with Redundancy (τ > 1)
Providing data redundancy improves data reliability since MS is able to re-
construct the original data even it cannot obtain all the data shares. However,
this advantage is also enjoyed by ADV . Therefore, there is a tradeoff between
data reliability and PrBSe_comp. In the following, we will investigate the impact
of data redundancy on data reliability and PrBSe_comp.
As shown in Figs. 5.3 (A)-(C) and Figs. 5.3 (G)-(I), ODDS has the best
performance (the lowest PrBSe_comp) among all the schemes. Compared with
the simulation results shown in Figs. 5.2 (A)-(C) and Figs. 5.2 (G)-(I), provid-
ing data redundancy slightly compromises PrBSe_comp. Whereas, as shown in
Figs. 5.3 (D)-(F) and Figs. 5.3 (J)-(L), data reliability is improved significantly
due to data redundancy. Again ODDS has the highest probability of data
reliability among all the schemes and the data reliability also increases as PTi
increases.
Figs. 5.3 (G)-(I) and Figs. 5.3 (J)-(L) also show the effect of nbi with re-
spect to PrBSe_comp and data reliability. We observe that increasing the num-
ber of neighbors also benefits to PrBSe_comp and data reliability. The number
of neighbor nodes increases as data reliability increases and PrBSe_comp de-
creases. However, distributing data shares to more neighbor nodes also causes
more communication overhead. Therefore, according to the results shown in
Figs. 5.3 (G)-(I) and Figs. 5.3 (J)-(L), for a given security level λi, it is very easy
to choose the average number of neighbors when a sensor network is deployed
with uniformly distributed nodes. Moreover, as shown in Figs. 5.3 (J)-(L), we
observe that the probability of data reliability of ODDS is much higher than
RSSS [109] especially when nbi is small (see the curve in the circle). The rea-
son is that RSSS [109] distributes data shares randomly no matter how low
the security level of node is. This is another evidence to show that ODDS has
the best performance among NS, AS, HKS and RSSS [109].
Finally, Table 5.2 summarizes the comparison results of different schemes in
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terms of FSe, BSe, Resilient to Node Failure (RNF ) and Resilient to Message
Failure (RMF ). The results demonstrate that the proposed scheme has the
best performance among these studied schemes.
Table 5.2: Security and performance comparison result among existed work
and enhanced schemes in terms of forward secrecy, backward secrecy, RNF,
and RMF.
forward secrecy backward secrecy RNF RMF
DISH [60] Yes Probabilistic No No
POSH [21] Yes Probabilistic No No
RSSS [109] Partial Probabilistic Normal Normal
ODDS Yes Enhanced Probabilistic Strong Normal
5.4 Discussions
In this section, we describe coding scheme selection, and discuss the drawbacks
of ODDS and possible improvements.
5.4.1 Coding Scheme Selection
Both (n,m) Reed-Solomon codes and (n,m) secret sharing scheme [79] can be
used for encoding a data into n data shares, where any m (m ≤ n) data shares
can be used for recovering the original data. The advantage of (n,m) secret
sharing scheme is that it can provide excellent security of the secret in the
sense of information-theoretic security, where any combination of fewer than
m secret shares cannot reveal any information of the secret. The weak point
of the scheme is that the size of the share is still the same as the original data.
Compared with the secret sharing scheme, a (n,m) Reed-Solomon codes is a
kind of erasure code that can encode a block of data into n fragments, and
any m can be used to reconstruct the original block. Its advantage is that
the size of its encoded block is 1
m
of the original block. The weak point is
Reed-Solomon codes is not so secure as the secret sharing scheme.
Multi-level secret sharing scheme [4], which distinguishes the importance
of different shares with same share length, can distribute more weight shares
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to nodes with higher security levels. It can reduce communication overhead
but increase computation overhead to sensors.
Thus, selecting suitable coding schemes needs to consider the tradeoff be-
tween communication cost, storage cost and computation cost depending on
practical application scenarios.
5.4.2 Drawbacks and Possible Solutions
There are two drawbacks of the scheme proposed in this chapter:
1) Recall Pi is the probability that node si is compromised by the ADV
and can be used for evaluation the security level of si (higher Pi corresponds
to lower security level). The node selection priority of the proposed optimized
data distribution scheme is based on Pi, so that a sensor si with the lowest Pi
(the highest security level) would attract more data from its neighbors. In other
words, all the neighbor nodes of si would prefer to distribute data to this node
because it is the safest choice in their neighbor nodes. Hence, compared with
other nodes, si has to use more storage memory to store the data distributed
by its neighbor nodes. A straightforward solution is to replace low Pi (high
security level) nodes with storage sensor node [63] (with large memory) in the
network. We are currently working on the scheme that focuses on how to
coordinate sensor nodes to support long-lived UWSNs.
2) Since the probability, Pi, is maintained in the probability vector of the
neighbor nodes of si, the neighbor nodes evaluate the priority of si based on
Pi. Thus, once a node is compromised by an ADV , its security level should
be degraded and should be known by its neighbors. Otherwise, the neighbor
nodes would still distribute data to it based on its previous security level and
the security level of data are undermined. To solve this problem, a challenge
is to dynamically estimate the security level of nodes in UWSNs. Since a
UWSN may consist of many sensors and there is no trusted third party inside,
the challenge can convert to how to estimate reputation (security level) in
distributed networks without a trusted third party. This observation indeed
motivates our study on trust management in UWSNs in the next chapter.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter we proposed a constrained optimization data distribution scheme
to maximize security level of data and optimize data reliability. As demon-
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strated in the chapter, the proposed scheme has low storage overhead, compu-
tational efficiency and it is especially suitable for UWSN applications. Com-
pared with other existing schemes [60, 21, 109], our scheme does not rely on
reliable nodes and communication channels, and is resilient to message failure
and node failure with certain probabilities. Furthermore, through detailed se-
curity and efficiency analysis, we show that the proposed scheme can guarantee
forward secrecy and maximize probabilistic backward secrecy while providing
maximum data reliability. Finally, the simulation results demonstrate that,
compared with other schemes, the proposed scheme is more robust to support
forward secrecy, backward secrecy, and data reliability.
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Figure 5.2: The comparison results of different schemes in terms of probability
of backward secrecy to be compromised, PrBSe_comp, and probability of data
reliability when τ = 1 and probability threshold value PTi = 15%, PTi = 30%
and PTi = 45%, respectively.
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Figure 5.3: The comparison results of different schemes in terms of probability
of backward secrecy to be compromised, PrBSe_comp, and probability of data
reliability when τ < 1 and probability threshold value PTi = 15%, PTi = 30%
and PTi = 45%, respectively.
Chapter 6
Trust Management
In the previous chapter we proposed a constrained optimization data distribu-
tion scheme, in which sensors send data to their neighbor nodes based on the
security level of those neighbor nodes. In this chapter we develop a mecha-
nism to show how the security level of sensors can be evaluated based on their
trustworthiness.
In UWSNs, given the absence of the trusted third party, i.e., sink or base
station, for storing trust-related data, we have to decide where and how to
store trust related information in a secure and reliable way. As communication
channels between sensors are generally noisy and unstable, another question
is how to deal with such uncertainty. Furthermore, it requires to build a trust
management scheme suitable for UWSNs that is efficient, robust and scalable
with respect to trust-related data storage and trustworthiness calculations.
6.1 Related Work
Before presenting our own mechanism, we review the existing trust manage-
ment schemes in WSNs, Ad hoc, and P2P networks.
6.1.1 Trust Management in WSNs
Several solutions have been recently proposed for trust management in WSNs.
In [48] the authors considered a TIBFIT protocol to diagnose and to mask
arbitrary node failures in an event-driven WSN. Each node is assigned a trust
index to track and report events correctly. Cluster heads analyze the event
reports using the trust index. In [35], the authors proposed a Bayesian trust
63
64 Security Mechanisms in Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks
management framework where each node maintains reputation metrics to as-
sess past behavior of other nodes and to predict their future behavior. The
authors in [113] proposed iTrust, an integrated trust framework for WSNs. A
group of monitor nodes is responsible for evaluating neighbor nodes based on
their behavior. A trust aware routing for WSNs was proposed in [76]. The
protocol exploits prior routing patterns and link quality to determine efficient
routes. In [41], the authors proposed a trust-based routing scheme that selects
a forwarding path based on the trust requirement of a packet and the trust
level of neighbor nodes.
6.1.2 Trust Management in Ad hoc Networks
More trust management studies were conducted in the field of ad hoc networks
[12, 85, 73, 67]. The authors in [12] proposed a reputation system based on
Bayesian estimation of misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks. The work in
[85] introduced an information theoretic framework to measure trust and to
model trust evolution. They proposed four axioms to address trust relation-
ships through third parties. A data-centric framework for trust establishment
was proposed in [73]. Here, trust is based on data rather than on the data gen-
erating nodes. In [67], the authors proposed a distributed trust scheme based
on distributed public key certificate management for mobile ad hoc networks.
Each user of the network is permitted to issue public key certificates and to
perform authentication using certificate chains without trusted authorities.
6.1.3 Trust Management in P2P Networks
A Peer-Trust model based on a weighted sum of five feedback parameters was
proposed in [111]. The model takes advantage of public key infrastructure
and trust propagation to secure remote scores and to prevent peer abuses.
PowerTrust [119], a robust and scalable P2P reputation scheme, was proposed
to leverage the power-law feedback factors. PowerTrust dynamically selects
a number of the most reputable nodes, namely, power nodes, based on a dis-
tributed ranking mechanism. In addition, it uses a look-ahead random work
strategy, leveraging the power nodes to improve global reputation accuracy
and aggregation speed. In [108], the authors developed Credence, a decentral-
ized object reputation and ranking system for P2P networks. Credence allows
peers to discover trustworthy peers when direct observations or interactions
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through a flow-based trust computation are not possible.
Trust management solutions developed for traditional WSNs rely on the
presence of an online trusted third party, e.g., to store and distribute trust
data [48, 41, 76, 35, 113]. They cannot be applied directly to UWSNs due to
the absence of the sink (or the base station).
Most schemes, e.g., [12, 85, 73, 67, 111, 119, 108], proposed for P2P and
ad hoc networks are not suitable for UWSNs for the following reasons. First,
UWSNs are more constrained with respect to computation, communication
and power capabilities than P2P and ad hoc networks. Schemes designed for
P2P and ad hoc networks based on public key cryptography are not suitable
for UWSNs. Second, the number of nodes in ad hoc networks is lower than in
UWSNs. A UWSN is likely to have thousands of sensors. P2P networks may
have more nodes than UWSNs, but the nodes in P2P networks do not have
the same computational and energy constraints as in UWSNs. Finally, sensor
nodes provide their services for a lifetime, until their energy is depleted, while
P2P nodes enter and exit the networks randomly.
6.2 Network Scenario, Security Model and De-
sign Goals
6.2.1 Network Scenario
In this chapter we continue using the network model defined in Subsection 3.2.1.
Additionally, we assume that a sensor, sj ∈ S, is located at point pj and
has the transmission range φ. Thus sj at point pj can communicate with
sm at point pm if D(pj, pm) ≤ φ (j,m ∈ {1, ..., N}), where D(pj, pm) is the
distance between pj and pm. Each sensor sj ∈ S has nbj neighbors (we
say that sm is one of sj’s neighbors if D(pj, pm) ≤ φ), as shown as yellow
(light shadow) points in the circle in Fig. 6.1, which compose a set of neigh-
bors of sj, NBj = {s|s ∈ S and D(pj, p) ≤ φ}. sj’s neighbors, sj,i ∈ NBj
(i ∈ {1, ..., nbj}), are assumed to have their own trust opinions T ji regard-
ing sj’s trustworthiness Υj 1, and are referred to as trust producers of sj.
The nodes storing trust-related data are referred to as trust managers TM rj
1In the context of this chapter, trust opinion T is one sensor’s conclusion about the trust
level of another sensor; trustworthiness Υ is the weighted-sum of trust opinions over time
and across all involved sensors.
66 Security Mechanisms in Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks
m
s
,j t
m
T
js
,j t
iT
sensor node
hs
,j t
hT
,j is
as
Figure 6.1: An example of network topology.
(r ∈ {1, ..., α}) of sj, where α is the number of trust managers in the network.
Meanwhile sensors that want to know other sensors’ trustworthiness are re-
ferred to as trust consumers. The relationship between trust producer, trust
manager and trust consumer is characterized in Fig. 6.2.
We assume that time is divided into equal time intervals and that sensors
maintain loosely synchronized clocks. At time interval t, sj’s neighbor sj,i
generates trust opinion T j,ti regarding sj. Note that trust consumers can be
anywhere in the network but trust producers are only within the transmission
rang of the corresponding sensor. Furthermore, there is an MS visiting the
network at either fixed or irregular intervals to collect data from sensors.
6.2.2 Security Model
The UWSNs can be attacked in many ways. In this chapter, we focus on an
adversary ADV launching attacks against trust data 2. We divide the attacks
into two categories: trust eraser and trust pollution attacks.
The effect of the trust eraser attack (denoted as ADV_Del) is that trust
data stored in sensors are lost and cannot be retrieved by trust consumers. For
instance, ADV could try to compromise sensors and to erase the trust data
stored in them. Moreover, when sensors are nonfunctional (e.g., due to energy
depletion, natural disasters, etc.) their stored trust data is lost.
In case of trust pollution attack, ADV does not delete the trust data but
rather pollute them. We consider the following pollution strategies:
2In this chapter trust data means trust related data, such as opinions, trust measurement,
etc., which are used by trust management scheme to make trust aware decisions.
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Figure 6.2: The relationship between trust producer, trust manager and trust
consumer.
• Environmental effect (ADV_Noise). Since sensors’ trust opinions are
generated based on sensors’ previous behavior, they may generate some
noise due to environmental effects.
• Homogeneous attack (ADV_Homo). Given a sensor sj, ADV tries to
either increase sj trustworthiness Υj or decrease it. To do so, in each
time interval ADV can compromise a subset of sensors in order to find
the trust managers and to modify the trust data thereby generating false
trust opinions.
• Hybrid attack, denoted as ADV_Hbd. This attack is more severe since
ADV can launch both increasing and decreasing Υ attacks.
For clarity, we assume that the number k of compromised sensors in each time
interval is fixed. We referred to this number as the compromising capability.
The compromised sensor can occur anywhere in the network.
6.2.3 Design Goals
To design an efficient, robust and scalable trust management scheme in UWSNs,
the following design goals are targeted.
1) Robustness. The scheme is still functional, even though certain sensor
nodes totally lose the functionality due to the depletion of battery power or
physical corruption (e.g., smash, melt or corrode). Moreover, the trust-related
data stored in the system should remain available to queries even if certain
sensor nodes fail. That is, the system should be robust against ADV_Del.
2) Resilience. The generated trustworthiness Υ should be close to its real
value as much as possible even though ADV tries to inject false trust opinions
68 Security Mechanisms in Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks
to pollute it. In other words, the system should be resilient to ADV_Noise,
ADV_Homo and ADV_Hbd.
3) Scalability. The scheme should apply to a UWSN consisting of a large
number of sensor nodes.
4) Efficiency. The designed trust management scheme should be efficient
in terms of both communication cost and storage cost.
5) Consistency. Both trust opinions generated by trust producers and trust
queries from trust consumers should be routed correctly to trust managers
where the trust-related data are stored.
6.2.4 Performance Metrics
The following metrics are defined to evaluate the performance of our scheme.
• Pr[survival]jt is defined as the probability that at least one trust man-
agers of sj survive to time interval t.
• Communication Cost : The communication cost consists of two shares:
the cost to send generated trust opinions to trust managers; and the cost
of querying and retrieving trustworthiness stored in trust managers. Cj
is defined as communication cost regarding sj. Since trust value queries
and answers are short messages, for the sake of simplicity, we assume
that sending and receiving a trust value message across each hop have
the same cost, and approximate communication costs as O(N) message
transmissions for broadcast and O(
√
N) for point-to-point routing [72].
• Storage Cost : Sj is the storage cost of storing the trust opinions and
trustworthiness of sj, in the whole UWSN.
6.3 Preliminaries
6.3.1 Information Collection on Sensor Behavior:
Generally, there are two common approaches to evaluate trust in WSNs. First,
direct trust where sensor sj’s behavior can be directly observed by its neighbors
{sj,i}nbji=1. Second, indirect trust where sj,i receives recommendations from other
sensors about trustworthiness of sj. In this chapter we only focus on direct
trust.
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The information collected based on entity’s previous behavior [75] is one
of the most important aspects of trust management solutions. Which kind
of information about sensors’ behavior is collected and analyzed varies from
application to application. For example, a watchdog mechanism that monitors
the behavior of neighboring nodes is proposed in [35] where node reputation
and trust evolution are represented as a Bayesian formulation. Node cap-
ture attack [3], where nodes are removed from the network for a non-trivial
amount of time, can be detected by their neighbors, since a node may appear
and disappear from the network under normal conditions. One-shot probing
is proposed in [87] to identify misbehaving nodes. Furthermore, the authors
in [102] address the trust inference problem as a shortest path problem on a
weighted directed graph, and utilized the theory of semirings for trust evalua-
tion operations.
Investigating how to collect and evaluate sensor pre-behavior is beyond
the scope in this study. Nodes may use the analyzing and scoring sensor
trust approaches (e.g., [35, 3, 87, 102]) as a function of trust opinions. That
is, in a time interval t, sj’s neighbors, {sj,i}nbji=1, can generate trust opinions
T j,ti (i ∈ {1, ..., nbj}) regarding sj, by monitoring sj’s previous behavior.
6.3.2 Subjective Logic
In UWSNs, monitoring sensor behavior based on their previous communica-
tion record introduces uncertainty information since communication channels
between sensors are unstable and noisy. To describe this uncertainty infor-
mation, we adopt a subjective logic approach [45] in this chapter. In the
subjective logic approach, the term opinion is defined to represent an opinion
about trustworthiness. The definition of opinion is as follows.
Definition 6.1. An opinion is a triplet, T = {B,D,U}, where B,D,U ∈ [0, 1]
and B+D+U = 1, and that B, D, and U correspond to belief, disbelief, and
uncertainty respectively.
A trust value can be thus defined based on these three parameters. For
instance, a trust value associated with distrust could be represented as opinion
T1 = {0.0, 0.93, 0.07}, whereas a trust value associated with trust could be
expressed as opinion T2 = {0.88, 0.0, 0.12}.
Definition 6.2. Let sX , sY , and sZ be three sensors. Then TXY = {BXY , DXY , UXY }
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and TXZ = {BXZ , DXZ , UXZ } denote the opinions of sY and sZ about the trust-
worthiness of sX . Then the combined consensus opinion is defined as follows:
TXY,Z = T
X
Y ⊕ TXZ = {BXY,Z , DXY,Z , UXY,Z}
where
BXY,Z = (B
X
Y U
X
Z +B
X
Z U
X
Y )/(U
X
Y + U
X
Z − UXY UXZ ),
DXY,Z = (D
X
Y U
X
Z +D
X
Z U
X
Y )/(U
X
Y + U
X
Z − UXY UXZ ),
and
UXY,Z = (U
X
Y U
X
Z )/(U
X
Y + U
X
Z − UXY UXZ ).
The trust value expressed as subjective opinions instead of one simple trust
level provides more flexible trust model of the real world. Hereby, according to
Definition 6.2, the consensus of trust opinions generated by sensors {sj,i}nbji=1
in time interval t about sensor sj is
T j,t1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ T j,ti ⊕ · · · ⊕ T j,tnbj = T j,t1,··· ,i,··· ,nbj . (6.1)
Definition 6.3. Let sX and sY be two sensors. Then {TX,t1Y , ..., TX,tnY } denote
the opinion of sY about the trustworthiness of sX on time intervals {t1, ...tn}
respectively, where TX,tnY = {BX,tnY , DX,tnY , UX,tnY }. Then sY ’s opinion about the
trustworthiness of sX on t1 ∪ · · · ∪ tn is defined as
TX,t1∪···∪tnY = {BX,t1∪···∪tnY , DX,t1∪···∪tnY , UX,t1∪···∪tnY } (6.2)
where
BX,t1∪···∪tnY =
1
n
(
BX,t1Y + · · ·+BX,tnY
)
,
DX,t1∪···∪tnY =
1
n
(
DX,t1Y + · · ·+DX,tnY
)
,
and
UX,t1∪···∪tnY =
1
n
(
UX,t1Y + · · ·+ UX,tnY
)
.
According to Definitions 6.2 and 6.3, we define trustworthiness Υj in terms
of sensor consensus to combine trust opinions generated by sensors {sj,i}nbji=1 in
Trust Management 71
time interval {t}tnt=t1 as
Υj = T j,t1∪···∪tn1,··· ,i,··· ,nbj . (6.3)
The Υj can be calculated with respect to sensor consensus or time as follows:
• With respect to sensor consensus :
Υj = T j,t1∪···∪tn1,··· ,i,··· ,nj
= T j,t1∪···∪tn1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ T j,t1∪···∪tni ⊕ · · · ⊕ T j,t1∪···∪tnnj .
• With respect to time:
Υj = T j,t1∪···∪tn1,··· ,i,··· ,nbj
= {Bj,t1∪···∪tn1,··· ,i,··· ,nbj , Dj,t1∪···∪tn1,··· ,i,··· ,nbj , U j,t1∪···∪tn1,··· ,i,··· ,nbj},
where
Bj,t1∪···∪tn1,··· ,i,··· ,nbj =
1
n
(
Bj,t11,··· ,i,··· ,nbj + · · ·+Bj,tn1,··· ,i,··· ,nbj
)
,
Dj,t1∪···∪tn1,··· ,i,··· ,nbj =
1
n
(
Dj,t11,··· ,i,··· ,nbj + · · ·+Dj,tn1,··· ,i,··· ,nbj
)
,
and
U j,t1∪···∪tn1,··· ,i,··· ,nbj =
1
n
(
U j,t11,··· ,i,··· ,nbj + · · ·+ U j,tn1,··· ,i,··· ,nbj
)
.
Remark: Definition 6.3 defines that each trust opinion has the same impact
with respect to time. Actually, the desired scheme should be time-aware. For
instance, the newer trust opinions may have higher impact on the trustworthi-
ness, and past trust opinions should be also taken into account. However, we
leave the time-aware trust calculation as our future work. We refer interested
readers to [45] for more details on subjective logic and to [66] for an example
of application of subjective logic in WSNs.
6.4 Efficient and Robust Storage of Trust Data
In traditional WSNs, a trusted third party, e.g., base station, is used to keep
and calculate received trust opinions. The queries of sensors’ trustworthiness
are also sent to and answered by the base station. However, as there is no
on-site base station in UWSNs, trust opinions of sensors need to be stored in
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sensors instead. Therefore, once sensor sj,i generates an opinion T j,ti at time
interval t, it either stores T j,ti locally or sends T
j,t
i to other nodes.
Next we consider three trust-related data storage schemes without involv-
ing the base station. First we consider two naive schemes and discuss their
shortcomings. Then we propose an advanced scheme to improve the naive
schemes.
6.4.1 Naive Scheme I (SI) - Trust Data Local Storage
The basic idea of the SI is to keep generated trust opinions locally, i.e., sj,i
generates T j,ti and then stores T
j,t
i in its own memory. In other words, sj,i is
not only one of sj’s trust producers but also one of sj’s trust managers.
The SI has three components: initialization, trust opinion local storage,
and trust opinion querying and calculation, as explained below:
(1) Trust opinion local storage.
In every time interval, each sensor generates trust opinions about its neigh-
bor nodes, combines it with previous trust opinions according to Eq. (6.2) and
stores it locally. For instance, sj,i generates T j,t1i , T
j,t2
i and T
j,t3
i at t1, t2 and
t3, respectively, and stores the combined trust opinion in its memory as
T ji = T
j,t0∪t1∪t2∪t3
i .
(2) Trust opinion querying and calculation.
Consider the example in Fig. 6.1. Assume that sensor sa intends to es-
timate the trustworthiness Υj of another sensor, sj. It broadcasts a trust
opinion request, ASK(T j), to ask sensors to collect opinions of other sen-
sors about sj. Here, we assume a suitable broadcast authentication proto-
col, e.g., multilevel µTESLA [51] for secure and reliable transmission of such
broadcast values. If there is no direct relationship between two sensors (e.g.,
sh and sj), they keep most uncertain opinion about each other’s trusts, i.e.,
T jh = T
h
j = {0, 0, 1}. Upon receiving ASK(T j), each sensor sends feedback
messages, ANS(T j), to sa if they have direct relationship with sj. Otherwise
they just drop ASK(T j). Next, sa combines received sensors’ opinions using
consensus operator (Eq. (6.1)) to compute sj’s trustworthiness Υj, and keeps
the results as Υj.
Proposition 6.4. In the Naive Scheme I, the probability that at least one trust
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manager node stays as not compromised for up to time interval t isPr[survival]
j
t = 1, k ∗ t < nbj
Pr[survival]jt = 0, k ∗ t ≥ nbj ,
(6.4)
where nbj is the number of neighbor nodes and k is the compromising capability
of ADV as defined in Subsection 6.2.2.
Proof. In SI, each sensor sj has nbj trust managers and nbj trust producers in
its transmission range. It is easy for ADV to find the trust managers in the
transmission range of sj. In each time interval ADV compromises k sensors
(trust managers) in sj’s transmission range. Up to t-th time interval, k ∗ t
sensors (trust managers) are compromised. Therefore, k ∗ t ≥ nbj means that
all the trust managers are compromised, i.e., Pr[survival]jt = 0; otherwise
Pr[survival]jt = 1.
6.4.1.1 Communication Cost
Queries ASK(T j) are broadcast to all nodes at a cost of O(N). Responses
ANS(T j) are sent back to the trust consumer at a cost of O(
√
N) each. For
t time intervals, the cost becomes Cj = O(tN) + O(tnbj
√
N) = O(t(N +
nbj
√
N)), where N is the number of sensors in the network.
6.4.1.2 Storage Cost
For a sensor, sj, each neighbor in its transmission range generates one trust
opinion per time interval. As the generated trust opinions are combined over
time, the storage cost for each neighbor is O(1). There are nbj neighbors that
need to store the trust opinions regarding sj at a cost of O(nbj). That is,
Sj = O(nbj).
Discussion. According to Proposition 6.4, ADV can compromise all the
trust managers in a short time (≥ nbj
k
). After that, both pre-compromised
and post-compromised trust-related data can be modified by ADV once the
trust managers are compromised. Therefore, we need to hide trust managers
from ADV . Next we propose Naive Scheme II that supports a distributed
trust-related data storage.
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6.4.2 Naive Scheme II (SII) - Distributed Trust Data
Storage
In order to tackle the shortcomings of the SI, we should ensure that 1) a sensor
sj’s trust producer and trust manager are not the same node; 2) ADV cannot
easily find trust manager nodes; and 3) the desired scheme is resilient to node
failures.
Keeping these desired properties in mind, a straightforward solution is
that, for each node, specifying a designated node (which is not one of its
direct neighbors) as its trust manager node to store its trust-related data. The
procedures of the SII scheme is defined as follows:
(1) System initialization.
To provide trust-related data redundancy, in the beginning, each sensor,
sj, is associated with α randomly selected trust managers, {TM rj }αr=1. Trust
producers of sj store the ID of {TM rj }αr=1 since they need to send the generated
trust opinions to {TM rj }αr=1. Trust consumers store {sj, {TM rj }αr=1} in their
local memory so that trust consumers are able to retrieve sj’s trust-related
data from {TM rj }αr=1.
(2) Trust opinion distributed storage.
After generating trust opinions about sj, the trust producers of sj send
them to {TM rj }αr=1. Note that, in every time interval, TM rj receives nbj trust
opinions {T j,ti }nbji=1 from sj,i ∈ NBj (i ∈ [1, nbj]). After receiving {T j,ti }nbji=1, TM rj
first removes outlier trust opinions as noise (to be discussed in Section 6.6).
Then it calculates the trustworthiness Υj,tr with the received trust opinions
according to Eq. (6.3) where Υj,tr is the trustworthiness of sj stored in TM rj in
time interval t.
(3) Trustworthiness query and calculation.
Trust consumers send ASK(T j) to {TM rj }αr=1 to retrieve trustworthiness
{Υjr}αr=1 from sj’s trust manager nodes. Upon receiving α trustworthiness,
trust consumers remove outliers using the similarity threshold functions de-
fined in Section 6.6 and compute the expected value of the rest of Υj as sj’s
trustworthiness.
Proposition 6.5. In Naive Scheme II, the probability that at least one trust
Trust Management 75
manager node is not compromised up to time interval t is
Pr[survival]t = 1−
(
1−
t∏
t=1
(
1− k
N − (t− 1)k
))α
. (6.5)
Proof. Let Ert′ = 1 denote the event of r-th trust manager compromised by
ADV at time interval t′, and Ert′ = 0 denote the event of r-th trust manager
survival within the time interval t′. The probability of no trust manager nodes
surviving up to t is
Pr[E1t = 1 ∩ · · · ∩ Ert = 1 ∩ · · · ∩ Eαt = 1]
=Pr[E1t = 1] ∗ · · · ∗ Pr[Ert = 1] ∗ · · · ∗ Pr[Eαt = 1]
=Pr[Ert = 1]
α
Thus the probability of at least one trust manager node surviving up to t
is Pr[survival]t = 1− Pr[Ert = 1]α.
The probability that r-th trust manager survives up to t is
Pr[Ert = 0] =
(
1− k
N
)(
1− k
N − k
)(
1− k
N − 2k
)
· · ·
· · ·
(
1− k
N − (t− 1)k
)
=
t∏
t=1
(
1− k
N − (t− 1)k
)
.
Thus, we have
Pr[survival]t = 1− Pr[Ert = 1]α
= 1− (1− Pr[Ert = 0])α
= 1−
(
1−
t∏
t=1
(
1− k
N − (t− 1)k
))α
.
6.4.2.1 Communication Cost
Once a trust opinion is generated, it is sent and stored at the corresponding
trust managers within the network. The communication cost to store the trust
opinion is O(
√
N). Since nbj trust producers need to send trust opinions to
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α trust managers at each round, the total cost is O(tnbjα
√
N). Queries are
sent to the designated node (trust manager), which also returns a response,
both causing communication cost O(
√
N). That is, Cj = O(tnbjα
√
N) +
O(tα
√
N) = O(tnbjα
√
N).
6.4.2.2 Storage Cost
For a sensor, sj, all its trust producers (its neighbors) have to know that
a designated sensor, TMj, is the corresponding trust manager node, i.e., all
sensors sj,i ∈ NBj (i ∈ [1, nbj]), have to store the ID of TMj at a cost of
O(αnbj). In addition, any node in the network could be sj’s trust consumer,
consequently every node has to know which node is sj’s trust manager. That
is, every node in the network has to store the ID of sj and the ID of its
corresponding trust manager TMj, which causes O(N) storage cost. Thus,
Sj = O(α(N + nbj)).
Discussion. In order to compare SII with SI, numerical results obtained in
MATLAB using Eq. (6.4) and Eq. (6.5) are illustrated in Fig. 6.3.
Impact of the number of sensors, N : Fig. 6.3 (A) shows the impact of N on
Pr[survival]t, where compromising capability k = 5 and the upbound round
of sensor surviving t = 150. We can see that SII has much better performance
than SI in terms of Pr[survival]t, and that Pr[survival]t of SII increases as
either N or the number of trust manager nodes, α, increases. There are two
reasons. First, increasing N decreases the probability of ADV_Del finding the
trust manager nodes. Second, increasing α increases trust data redundancy,
forcing ADV_Del to compromise more trust manager nodes to erase the data.
Impact of the compromising capability, k: Fig. 6.3 (B) shows the impact of
k on Pr[survival]t, where N = 10000 and the upbound time interval of sensor
survival t = 150. We can see that Pr[survival]t decreases as k increases. The
reason is that higher k means that ADV_Del can compromise more sensor per
time interval, increasing the probability of find the trust manager nodes. In
contrast, increasing α increases the trust data redundancy, resulting in higher
Pr[survival]t. Finally, we observe that SII has much higher Pr[survival]t
than SI.
Impact of the upbound time interval of sensor survival, t: Fig. 6.3 (C) shows
the impact of t on Pr[survival]t, where N = 10000 and k = 5. We observe
that t has no impact on Pr[survival]t of SI, and that Pr[survival]t decreases
as t increases. Again, SII has higher Pr[survival]t than that of SI.
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As discussed above, these results clearly demonstrate that SII is much more
resilient to ADV_Del than SI. However, as discussed above, the storage cost
of SII is proportional to α(N + nbj), causing huge storage cost especially in
large-scale UWSNs (see Figs. 6.7 (A) and (B)). This limitation motivates us
to design scalable scheme that can reduce storage cost caused by distributed
storage while keeping the same Pr[survival]t with SII.
6.4.3 Advanced Scheme (AS)
To reduce the large storage cost in SII, we propose AS. The idea of AS is
motivated by GHT [72] where nodes can put and get data based on their data
type, i.e., Put(DataType,DataV alue) and Get(DataType), thereby support-
ing a hash-table-like interface. Since each sensor’s ID is unique in the network,
trust producers are able to put trust opinions to trust managers based on sensor
ID, i.e., Put(sj, T j,ti ), and trust consumers are able to get trustworthiness from
trust managers using the same sensor ID, i.e., Get(sj). In other words, trust
opinions are pushed, and stored at the same trust manager node. Meanwhile it
enables trust consumers to pull trustworthiness from the trust manager nodes
consistently. Neither trust producers nor trust consumers need to store IDs
of trust manager node, reducing storage cost significantly. Furthermore, the
scheme should be robust against node failures. That is, the scheme should be
resilient to ADV_Del. Thus, trust opinions are pushed to α (α > 1) trust
manager nodes, whereas trust consumers pull trustworthiness from α trust
managers. To do so, we modify the original basic operations of GHT fromPut(DataType,DataV alue)Get(DataType)
to Put(sj, T
j,tl
i , r)
Get(sj, r)
∀r ∈ [1, α].
Put(sj, T
j,t
i , α) is the function where trust producer sj,i is able to put its
trust opinion T j,ti regarding sj to the r-th trust manager node of sj, where α
is the number of trust manager nodes specified by MS when the network is
deployed. Whereas, Get(sj, r) is the function where trust consumers are able
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to get sj’s trustworthiness Υj from the r-th trust manager node of sj. That
is, each node has α trust manager nodes to store its trust opinions from its
neighbors for data redundancy. In AS, trust opinions regarding a sensor, sj, is
hashed by the sensor’s ID sj to a geographical location. The node closest to the
hashed geographical location is referred to as the trust manager node where
data are sent to and retrieved from. As an example, as shown in Fig. 6.4,
a sensor’s ID sj is hashed to α = 3 random geographical locations in the
sensor network by using a secure hash function Lrj = hr(sj) = h(hr−1(sj)) 3
(∀r ∈ {1, ..., α}); trust producers (e.g., sj,i and bm) and trust consumers (e.g.,
sa) can send trust opinions and trust query requests to Lrj using GPSR [46];
and the closest node to the location Lrj , namely trust manager (see {TM rj }3r=1
in Fig. 6.4), can receive the trust opinions and trust query requests. The AS
takes advantages of GHT and GPSR working as follows:
1
jTM
trust query and pull path
js
trust push path
as
sensor node
ib
mb
1
jL
2
jL
3
jL
2
jTM
3
jTM
Figure 6.4: A simple example of GHT techniques on UWSNs with α = 3.
(1) System initialization.
Each node is preloaded with a secure hash function, denoted as h, and the
redundancy factor α specified byMS depending on application scenarios. All
nodes know their own locations, and the locations of the nodes which are a
single hop away from them.
(2) Trust opinion storage based on GHT.
In time interval t, after T j,ti is generated, sj,i uses the function Put(sj, T
j,t
i , r)
to put T j,ti to α trust manager nodes. In other words, sj,i performs hr(sj) to
3Note that Lrj is not the location of sj but the location closest to the r-th trust manager
node of sj .
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obtain L1j , ...,Lαj , and then sends T j,ti to locations L1j , ...,Lαj using GPSR, re-
spectively. The closest node to location Lrj , denoted as TM rj , finally receives
the trust opinion T j,ti and is called the r-th trust manager node of sj.
(3) Trust opinion querying and calculation.
A trust consumer node, e.g., sh, intends to know the trustworthiness of sj.
It uses the function Get(sj, r) ∀r ∈ [1, α] to get trustworthiness {Υjr}αr=1 from
sj’s α trust manager nodes. Similar as the put process, sh performs hr(sj) to
obtain L1j , · · · ,Lαj , and sends ASK(T j∗ ) to locations L1j , · · · ,Lαj using GPSR.
The closest nodes to L1j , · · · ,Lαj , i.e., trust manager nodes {TM rj }αr=1, finally
receive ASK(T j∗ ) and then send {Υjr}αr=1 to sh.
Proposition 6.6. Naive Scheme II and the Advanced Scheme have the same
Pr[survival]t. That is
Pr[survival]t = 1−
(
1−
t∏
t=1
(
1− k
N − (t− 1)k
))α
.
Proof. The same as for Proposition 6.5. The numerical results are shown in
Fig. 6.3.
6.5 Efficiency and Robustness Evaluation
In this section we conduct a set of simulations in MATLAB to show that AS
has the strongest performance among these three schemes in terms of efficiency
and robustness. We consider a UWSN where 10000 nodes are randomly dis-
tributed in a 3000× 3000 units area. The other parameters are set as follows.
Each sensor has transmission range φ = 150 units. ADV has compromising ca-
pability k = 25. The number of trust managers nodes α = 3. The simulation
results are averaged over 20 randomly deployed networks and are explained
below.
Figs. 6.5 (A), (B), and (C) show the simulation results of t in terms of α,
k, and φ. Fig. 6.5 (A) shows the impact of α on t, where k = 25 and φ = 150.
We can see that increasing α improves the performance of t of SII and AS,
but has no effect on that of SI. This is because, in SII and AS, higher α forces
ADV_Del to compromise more trust manager nodes to erase trust data. In
SI, however, all generated trust opinions are stored locally, which is not related
to α. Fig. 6.5 (B) shows the impact of k on t, where α = 3 and φ = 150. We
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observe that increasing k decreases the performance of t of all three schemes.
The reason is that increasing k enables ADV_Del compromising more sensor
per time interval, increasing the probability of finding trust manager nodes.
Fig. 6.5 (C) shows that φ has no impact on SII and AS in terms of t but slightly
increases the performance of t in SI. As explained above, Figs. 6.5 (A), (B),
and (C) clearly demonstrate that SII and AS have better performance than SI
does with respect to t.
Figs. 6.6 (A), (B), and (C) show the simulation results of communication
cost C in terms of α, k, and φ, respectively. We observe that trust data dis-
tributed storage provides resilience to ADV_Del, and increases t, but causes
larger communication cost. The reason is that trust producers in SII and AS
send trust opinions to α trust manager nodes for adding trust data redun-
dancy. In addition, increasing φ enables that more sensors can monitor their
neighbor’s behavior and then generate trust opinions. Thus more trust opin-
ions have to sent to trust manager nodes. We can see that there is a tradeoff
between trust data reliability and communication cost. Therefore, given a de-
sired data reliability, we can select suitable values of α and φ for decreasing
C. For instance, as shown in Figs. 6.6 (B) and (C), the communication cost is
acceptable if α ≤ 3 and φ ≤ 120.
Fig. 6.7 (A) shows the impact of α on S, where φ = 150. We can see that
SII has very large storage cost S, and that S obviously increases as α increases.
This coincides with the analysis in Subsubsection 6.4.2.2. Whereas, AS and
SI have very low storage cost, and α almost has no impact on S. Fig. 6.7 (B)
shows the impact of φ on S, where α = 3. We observe that φ has no impact
on AS in terms of S but slightly increases S of SI and SII, and that AS and SI
have very low storage cost. Finally, as discussed above, Figs. 6.7 (A) and (B)
both show that AS has the lowest storage cost among them.
Discussion. We have the following observations.
(1) Robustness. As there are α trust mangers in the network, in each time
interval, generated trust opinions {T j,ti }nbji=1 are routed to and stored in these
α trust managers. Therefore, the trustworthiness is available to be retrieved
even up to α− 1 trust managers lose function totally. That is, the SII and AS
are resilient to ADV_Del, as shown in Figs. 6.5 (A)(B)(C).
(2) Efficiency. SII and AS have the same communication cost. In addition,
AS requires much less storage cost than SII does. Unlike SII, given a sensor sj,
trust producers do not need to store the ID of corresponding trust managers
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Figure 6.7: Simulation results: α/φ vs. S.
of sj due to the put and get function of GHT. For α trust managers, the total
storage cost is O(α(N + nbj)) for SII and O(α) for AS. Thus, AS is more
efficient than SII.
(3) Scalability. As discussed above, the storage cost of AS has no relation
with the number of the sensors, N . That is, increasing N does not increase
storage cost of AS. Moreover, Subsubsection 6.4.2.1 demonstrates that the
communication cost of AS is proportional to
√
N . For example, when the
number of sensors N increases 10 times from 1000 to 10000, the communication
cost increases merely 3 times. Therefore AS is scalable.
(4) Consistency. For a given sensor, sj, all generated trust opinions {T j,ti }nbji=1
are routed to {Lrj}αr=1, respectively. The nodes closest to {Lrj}αr=1 receive
{T j,ti }nbji=1 and store them in their local memories, where Lrj = hr(sj). As sensor
ID is unique in the network, for a given sensor sj, the generated hash values
{Lrj}αr=1 are also unique in the network due to the one-way property of the
hash function. As a consequence, all the trust producers and trust consumers
are able to find the exact trust managers to store and query trust-related data.
6.6 Trustworthiness Generation
Through the simulations and discussions in the previous section we have demon-
strated that AS significantly reduces storage cost caused by distributed data
storage and provides resilience to ADV_Del. In this section we continue to
investigate the impacts of the performance of the proposed schemes regard-
ing trustworthiness pollution attacks (i.e., ADV_Noise, ADV_Homo and
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ADV_Hbd) defined in Subsection 6.2.2.
Initially, for each sensor sj, trust opinion T j,0i could be set by MS based
on such information as the physical protection, the location, or the role of the
nodes. For example, a node, sj, buried under the ground has higher {T j,0i }nbji=1
than the exposed ones. After the trust opinions generated, a trust producer
sj,i is able to update T ji using time conjunction according to Eq. (6.2), and
trust consumers can calculate the trustworthiness Υj using sensor consensus
according to Eq. (6.1).
Next we conduct a set of simulations to study the trust resilience of the
proposed schemes with respect to trustworthiness generation over pollution at-
tacks. The uncompromised sensor nodes generate correct trust opinions cT j =
{cBj, cDj, cU j} whereas the compromised sensors generate false trust opinions
fT j = {fBj, fDj, fU j}, where cB and fB denote correct believe and false be-
lieve respectively, so do cD, cU , fD and fU in our simulations. These trust
opinion values are followed by normal distribution, i.e., B ∼ N (E(B), σ2),
where E(B) is the expected value of B and σ is the standard deviation of B.
In order to compare the impact of false trust opinions fT , in the simulations,
fT are generated after 20th time interval so that we can observe if there is
any difference before 20th time interval and after 20th time interval on the
trustworthiness of a node.
Let d(Bji , E(Bjm)) =
√
(Bji − E(Bjm))2 denote the Euclidean distance be-
tween Bji and its expected value E(Bjm) where j ∈ {1, ..., N} and i,m ∈
{1, ..., nbj}, and so as d(Dji , E(Djm) and d(U ji , E(U jm)).
6.6.1 Trust Consensus only Approach (TC-ONLY)
In this subsection we look at TC-ONLY, which we used in Section 6.4, as our
baseline. This approach generates trustworthiness based on trust consensus
only (Definition 6.2 and Definition 6.3). Through simulation results, we first
show that it is resilient toADV_Noise, and then demonstrate its shortcomings
with respect to ADV_Homo and ADV_Hbd.
6.6.1.1 Trust Resilience against ADV_Noise
To evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme with respect to envi-
ronment effect (ADV_Noise), i.e., d(aji , E(ajm)) ≈ 0 (a ∈ {B,D,U}), we
set the correct trust opinions as cT = {0.3, 0.3, 0.4} and σc = 0.01, where
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cB, cD ∼ N (0.3, 0.001), and cU = 1− cB − cD. In order to monitor environ-
ment effect, we set a certain percentage PrC of sensors generate trust opinions
with larger σf = 0.1.
Fig. 6.8 shows the simulation results of SI, SII and AS when different values
of PrC (from 10% to 40%) are specified. These figures are plotted by MAT-
LAB area function displaying three elements B, D and U in white, green (light
shadow), and red (black) respectively. The first row of Fig. 6.8 is the simulation
results of SI, we can see that after 20th time interval the obtained trustwor-
thiness Υ starts to become unstable. In addition, increasing the percentage
PrC of anomalous sensors makes Υ more unstable. The second row of Fig. 6.8
is the simulation results of SII and AS, we observe that Υ is very smooth no
matter how PrC is selected, and that the anomalous trust opinions have al-
most no influence on Υ (slightly increase Υ when PrC = 40%, see Fig. 6.8(H))
when SII and AS are employed. This is because trust consensus makes Υ
smooth. Comparing the first row of Fig. 6.8 and the second row of Fig. 6.8, it
is easy to see that SII and AS are more resilient against ADV_Noise than
SI. Therefore, trust consensus makes good performance against ADV_Noise,
i.e., d(aji , E(ajm)) ≈ 0 (a ∈ {B,D,U}).
6.6.1.2 Trust Resilience against ADV_Homo
Since ADV_Homo tries to either increase Υ or decrease Υ monotonously,
we conduct two sets of simulations. In the first set simulation, ADV_Homo
is assumed to generate false trust opinions fT to increase Υ. In contrast,
ADV_Homo is assumed to decrease Υ in the second set simulation.
Simulation one. To increase Υ, the most effective way for ADV_Homo is
to increase B and to decrease D simultaneously. That is, generating opinions
fT which satisfy E(cB) < E(fB) and E(cD) > E(fD). We select a spe-
cial case when cT = {0.1, 0.3, 0.6}, fT = {0.4, 0.1, 0.5} and σc = σf = 0.01.
The simulation results are as shown in Fig. 6.9. Again, the simulation results
of SI are plotted in the first row, and that of SII and AS are plotted in the
second row. We observe that results of SII and AS are smoother than that
of SI. After 20th time interval, Υ increases as ADV_Homo expected, mean-
ing that the trust consensus cannot tolerate ADV_Homo. In addition, when
PrC increases, Υ starts to increase. The reason is that more sensors gen-
erate false trust opinions, increasing the impact of false trust opinion fT in
trustworthiness Υ.
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Simulation two. In contrast, to decrease Υ, the most effective way for
ADV_Homo is to decrease B and to increase D simultaneously. That is,
E(cB) > E(fB) and E(cD) < E(fD). We set cT = {0.4, 0.1, 0.5}, fT =
{0.1, 0.3, 0.6}, σc = σf = 0.01 in the set of simulations. As shown in Fig. 6.10,
the results also illustrate that the trust consensus cannot tolerateADV_Homo.
After 20th time interval, Υ starts to decrease immediately. The same as sim-
ulation one, increasing PrC gives more influence on Υ, and SII and AS have
better performance than SI.
Through the simulation results conducted above, we conclude that TC-
ONLY cannot tolerate ADV_Homo.
6.6.1.3 Trust Resilience against ADV_Hbd
As ADV_Hbd is free to launch both increasing Υ attack and decreasing Υ
attack, we claim a scheme can tolerate ADV_Hbd if and only if the scheme
is able to get good results against both increasing Υ attack and decreasing
Υ attack. However, as shown in Fig. 6.9 and Fig. 6.10, the trust consensus
can get good results in neither increasing Υ attack nor decreasing Υ attack.
Therefore, the trust consensus cannot tolerate ADV_Hbd.
Discussion. From the simulation results shown above, it is easy to see
that TC-ONLY is not enough for trustworthiness calculation. It can only
tolerate ADV_Noise caused by environment effect. The reason is that using
trust consensus for trust calculation decreases uncertainty U and makes Υ
stable. However, it does not show good performance against ADV_Homo
and ADV_Hbd. The reason is that both correct trust opinions cT and false
trust opinions fT are taken into trustworthiness calculation as input, resulting
in the polluted trustworthiness Υ. To solve this problem, a straightforward
solution is to reduce the effect of fT as much as possible. Thus we propose
the next scheme that is able to remove false trust opinions.
6.6.2 Trust Consensus with One Parameter Similarity
Threshold Function (ONE-PARA)
As compromised trust producers may send false trust opinions to trust man-
agers to pollute trustworthiness, we use ONE-PARA to remove outliers. A one
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parameter similarity threshold function is defined as
ST (T ji ) =
√
(Bji − E(Bjm))2
BjiE(B
j
m)
. (6.6)
Any T ji is considered as an outlier if ST (T
j
i ) >  where  is a similarity thresh-
old factor (e.g.,  = 0.1).
The similarity threshold function is expected to take out false trust opinions
as much as possible. It is also desirable that false positives (trust opinions are
considered as false trust opinions even though they are correct ones), and
that false negatives (trust opinions are considered as correct trust opinions
even though they are false ones) are as fewer as possible. In other words, we
prefer to increase true positive as much as possible while keeping very low false
positives and false negatives. However, as the idea of the threshold function is
based on how far Bji is away from its expected value E(Bjm), and E(Bjm) is the
average value of both cB and fB, the selection of  is a dilemma. As shown in
Fig. 6.11, decreasing  increases true positives, however, also it increases false
positives. Fig. 6.11 (A) shows that most part of fB and a small part of cB are
considered as outliers, and a small part of false trust opinions are considered
as correct trust opinions (false negative), if suitable similarity threshold factor
 is specified. When  is selected too small, as shown in Fig. 6.11 (B), all the
false trust opinions are considered as outliers, however, more than half of the
correct trust opinions are also considered as outliers. In contrast, when  is
specified too large, as shown in Fig. 6.11, more than half of the false trust
opinions are considered as correct trust opinions. In addition, the more false
trust opinions are considered as correct trust opinions the more E(Bjm) closes
to E(fB). Fig. 6.12 shows the receiver operating characteristic curve with
cT = {0.1, 0.3, 0.6}, fT = {0.4, 0.1, 0.5}, σc = σf = 0.01 where similarity
threshold factor  is specified as 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 respectively. We observe
that true positives increases as false positives increases, and that the receiver
operating characteristic curves are the same when  = 0.6 and 0.8. That is the
reason why Figs. 6.13 (D)(I) and (E)(J) have the same performance.
6.6.2.1 Trust Resilience against ADV_Noise
Since ONE-PARA is an improved version of TC-ONLY, it works well against
ADV_Noise and can further filter outliers.
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0 1
(A) suitable similarity threshold factor ²
0 1
(B) similarity threshold factor ² is too small
0 1
(C) similarity threshold factor ² is too large
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ε
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ε
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ε
E(cB)
E(cB) E(fB)
Figure 6.11: An example of similarity threshold factor selection in terms of
false positive (FP), ture positive (TP) and false negative (FN).
6.6.2.2 Trust Resilience against ADV_Homo
As demonstrate above, TC-ONLY cannot tolerate ADV_Homo. To compared
with the simulations results of TC-ONLY, we conduct two more sets of other
simulations using the same parameters as the last two sets of simulations of TC-
ONLY when the percentage of compromised sensors are fixed as PrC = 20%.
The simulation results are as shown in Fig. 6.13 and Fig. 6.14. The first
row of them are the simulation results for SI, and the second row of those
figures are simulation results for SII and AS. Again, we can see that the gen-
erated Υ in SII and AS is more stable than Υ in SI. The first column of
Fig. 6.13 and Fig. 6.14 is the simulation results when the threshold function is
not applied (TC-ONLY). The rest of columns of those figures are the simula-
tion results when the threshold function (ONE-PARA) is applied where the
similarity threshold factor  is various from 0.2 to 0.8. It is easy to conclude
that TC-ONLY (see the first column of Fig. 6.13 and Fig. 6.14) cannot tolerate
ADV_Homo and ADV_Hbd as expected. Let us take a closer look at the
simulation results of SII and AS (the second column to the fifth column of
Fig. 6.13 and Fig. 6.14).
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Figure 6.12: Receiver operating characteristic curve with cT = {0.1, 0.3, 0.6},
fT = {0.4, 0.1, 0.5}, σc = σf = 0.01 where similarity threshold factor  are
specified as 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 respectively.
• Suitable . We observe that ONE-PARA works well (see Figs. 6.13 (I)(J)
and Figs. 6.14 (H)(I)) when a suitable  is selected.
•  is too small. We also illustrate that uncertainty U increases while
believe B and disbelieve D decrease in the second column of Fig. 6.13
and Fig. 6.14 which is coincident with the discussion above.
•  is too large. As shown in Fig. 6.11 (C), false negative increases as 
increases. That is, more false trust opinions are considered as correct
trust opinions, resulting in that disbelieve D increases and believe B
decreases, as shown in Figs. 6.14 (E)(J).
Discussion. As shown in Fig. 6.13 and Fig. 6.14, ONE-PARA works well in
some special cases (see Table 6.1). However, when d(Bji , E(Bjm)) ≈ 0 and
d(Dji , E(D
j
m)) is high, ONE-PARA cannot distinguish the difference of dis-
believe D, such as correct trust opinion cT = {0.1, 0.1, 0.8} and false trust
opinion fT = {0.1, 0.8, 0.1}, or cT = {0.1, 0.8, 0.1} and fT = {0.1, 0.1, 0.8}.
As shown in Fig. 6.15, when cB = fB = 0.1, cD = 0.1 and fD = 0.8, the dif-
ferences of disbelieve D cannot be detected by ONE-PARA, but it causes very
large consequence. We observe that there is no difference between the sim-
ulation results with ONE-PARA and without it. ADV ’s attack pollutes the
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trustworthiness severely for all schemes. As shown in Fig. 6.16, we also observe
that ADV ’s attack is tolerated by the consensus when d(Bji , E(Bjm)) ≈ 0 and
E(cB) > E(fB). Furthermore, ONE-PARA can only specify one parameter
among the three elements B, D and U so that it cannot tolerate ADV_Hbd.
The reason is that the most efficient way forADV to increase Υ is to increase B
and to decrease D simultaneously, whereas to decrease Υ is to decrease B and
to increase D simultaneously. The threshold functions based on one parameter
cannot control two parameters. To solve the pollution caused by ADV_Hbd,
and by the special case when d(Bji , E(Bjm)) ≈ 0 and E(cB) < E(fB), we
propose the next scheme.
6.6.3 Trust Consensus with Three Parameter Similarity
Threshold Function (T-PARA)
As ONE-PARA cannot identify the difference between cT = {0.1, 0.1, 0.8}
and false trust opinion fT = {0.1, 0.8, 0.1}. We propose a three parameters
similarity threshold function as follows,
ST (T ji ) =
√
(Bji − E(Bjm))2 + (Dji − E(Djm))2 + (U ji − E(U jm))2
BjiE(B
j
m) +D
j
iE(D
j
m) + U
j
i E(U
j
m)
. (6.7)
6.6.3.1 Trust Resilience against ADV_Noise
Again, since T-PARA is an improved version of TC-ONLY, the simulation
results are better than the ones obtained from TC-ONLY, even though the
simulation results with respect to ADV_Noise are not shown here.
6.6.3.2 Trust Resilience against ADV_Homo and ADV_Hbd
We use the same simulation parameters as ONE-PARA simulations. Fig. 6.17
and Fig. 6.18 show the simulation results. Again, the simulation results based
on TC-ONLY are plotted in the first column of them. We further observe
that the simulation results of T-PARA are much better than the simulation
results of TC-ONLY when suitable similarity threshold factor  is specified
(see Figs. 6.17 (H)(I)(J) and Figs. 6.18 (H)(I)(J)). Moreover, we observe that
T-PARA works well when  = 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8 (see Figs. 6.17 (H)(I)(J)), while
the simulation results is very poor in terms of ONE-PARA (see Fig. 6.15).
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Figs. 6.17 (B)(G) and Figs. 6.18 (B)(G) depict the impact of  when it is
specified too small.
Since T-PARA works well (see Figs. 6.17 (H)(I)(J) and Figs. 6.18 (H)(I)(J))
against both ADV_Homo increasing Υ attack and ADV_Homo decreasing
Υ attack. Therefore, it is resilient to ADV_Hbd.
6.6.4 Three Parameters withWeighted Factors (T-PARA-
WF)
Compared with Eq. (6.7) having equal weight to all three parameters, we define
a more flexible threshold function to prevent ADV from pollution attacks. An
improved version of Eq. (6.7) is proposed as follows,
ST (T ji ) =
√
x2(Bji − E(Bjm))2 + y2(Dji − E(Djm))2 + z2(U ji − E(U jm))2
xBjiE(B
j
m) + yD
j
iE(U
j
m) + zU
j
i E(U
j
m)
,
(6.8)
where xB + yD + zU = 1.
We add three weighted factors x, y and z into Eq. (6.7), enabling T-PARA-
WF with flexible ability. It can be adjusted depending on different scenarios.
For example, to prevent ADV from illegally increasing trustworthiness, we
can increase the weight of B in Eq. (6.8), i.e., increase x. In contrast, we can
increase y to prevent ADV from illegally decreasing trustworthiness. For pre-
venting ADV from ADV_Hbd, i.e., ADV generates false trust opinions both
to increase trustworthiness and to decrease trustworthiness, we can increase z
for increasing more weight on uncertainty U .
Note that Eq. (6.6) and Eq. (6.7) are special cases of Eq. (6.8) when x = 1,
y = z = 0 and x = y = z = 1, respectively. Furthermore, we have the following
observations.
• If ADV_Homo intends to increase Υ, ONE-PARA as a function of B
is better than T-PARA since B is the only weight factor in it. That is,
x = 1, y = z = 0, meaning that D and U do not have any weight.
• In contrast, if ADV_Homo intends to decrease Υ, ONE-PARA as a
function of D is better than T-PARA since D is the only weight factor
in it.
• T-PARA is resilient to ADV_Noise, ADV_Homo and ADV_Hbd.
100 Security Mechanisms in Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(A
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
1
0
%
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(E
)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
1
0
%
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(B
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(A
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(A
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(A
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(F
)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(F
)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(F
)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(F
)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(B
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.2
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1 (G
)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.2
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(B
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.2
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1 (G
)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.2
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(B
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.2
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1 (G
)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.2
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(C
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.4
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1 (H
)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.4
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(C
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.4
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1 (H
)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.4
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(C
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.4
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1 (H
)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.4
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(D
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.6
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1 (I)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.6
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(D
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.6
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1 (I)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.6
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(D
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.6
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1 (I)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.6
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(E
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.8
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1 (J
)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.8
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(E
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.8
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1 (J
)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.8
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(E
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.8
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1 (J
)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.8
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(C
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
3
0
%
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(G
)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
3
0
%
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(D
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
4
0
%
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
20
40
60
80
100
120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 1
(H
)
S
II,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
4
0
%
tim
e
in
terva
l,
t
l
trustworthiness, Υ
 
 
BDU
F
igure
6.17:
A
n
exam
ple
of
three
param
eters
threshold
function
w
orks
w
hile
trust
consensus
only
approach
and
one
param
eter
threshold
function
does
not
w
ork
w
ellw
here
cT
=
{0.1,0.1,0.8},
f
T
=
{0.1,0.8,0.1},
σ
c
=
σ
f
=
0.01.
Trust Management 101
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(A
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
1
0
%
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(E
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
1
0
%
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(B
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(A
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(A
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(A
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(F
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(F
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(F
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(F
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(B
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.2
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81(G
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.2
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(B
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.2
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81(G
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.2
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(B
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.2
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81(G
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.2
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(C
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.4
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81(H
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.4
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(C
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.4
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81(H
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.4
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(C
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.4
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81(H
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.4
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(D
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.6
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81(I
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.6
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(D
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.6
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81(I
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.6
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(D
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.6
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81(I
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.6
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(E
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.8
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81(J
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.8
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(E
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.8
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81(J
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.8
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(E
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.8
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81(J
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
2
0
%
,
²=
0
.8
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(C
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
3
0
%
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(G
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
3
0
%
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(D
)
S
I:
P
rC
=
4
0
%
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
81
(H
)
S
II
,
A
S
:
P
rC
=
4
0
%
ti
m
e
in
te
rv
a
l,
t l
trustworthiness,Υ
 
 
B D U
F
ig
ur
e
6.
18
:
A
n
ex
am
pl
e
of
tr
us
t
co
ns
en
su
s
on
ly
ap
pr
oa
ch
w
or
ks
w
el
l
w
hi
le
th
re
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
th
re
sh
ol
d
fu
nc
ti
on
sl
ig
ht
ly
co
m
-
pr
om
is
ed
th
e
re
su
lt
w
he
n

is
se
le
ct
ed
to
o
sm
al
l.
cT
=
{0
.1
,0
.8
,0
.1
},
f
T
=
{0
.1
,0
.1
,0
.8
},
σ
c
=
σ
f
=
0.
01
.
102 Security Mechanisms in Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks
Table
6.1:
Im
pacts
ofconsensus
and
threshold
functions
w
ith
respect
to
d
(B
ji ,E
(B
jm
)),
d
(D
ji ,E
(D
jm
))
and
d
(U
ji ,E
(U
jm
)).
T
h
resh
old
Fu
n
ction
d
(B
ji ,E
(B
jm
))
d
(D
ji ,E
(D
jm
))
d
(U
ji ,E
(U
jm
))
T
C
-O
N
LY
O
N
E
-PA
R
A
T
-PA
R
A
T
-PA
R
A
-W
F
(E
q.
(E
q.(6.6)))
(E
q.
(E
q.(6.7)))
(E
q.
(E
q.(6.8)))
≈
0
≈
0
≈
0
good
good
good
good
≈
0
high
E
(cD
)
>
E
(f
D
)
-
good
good
good
good
≈
0
E
(cD
)
<
E
(f
D
)
-
not
enough
not
enough
good
good
high
E
(cB
)
>
E
(f
B
)
-
-
not
enough
good
good
good
E
(cB
)
<
E
(f
B
)
-
-
not
enough
good
good
good
Trust Management 103
Table 6.2: ADV ’s pollution attack strategies and their countermeasures.
Countermeasures
ADV’s strategy TC-ONLY ONE-PARA T-PARA T-PARA-WF
ADV_Noise OK Good Good Good
ADV_Homo: increase Υ NO Good OK Good
ADV_Homo: decrease Υ NO Good OK Good
ADV_Hbd NO NO Good Good
• T-PARA-WF is a more flexible way to prevent ADV from various at-
tacks. The selection of x, y and z is depending on scenarios.
A conclusion of countermeasures against ADV ’s pollution attack strategies are
summarized in Table 6.2.
6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a family of efficient and robust trust man-
agement schemes for the first time in UWSNs. The AS utilized distributed
trust-related data storage to provide trust-related data reliability and took
advantage of both GHT and GPSR to find storage nodes and to route trust-
related data to them. In addition, a set of similarity threshold functions
are proposed to remove outliers. As the simulation results shown and dis-
cussed above, we demonstrated that SII and AS with T-PARA are resilient
to ADV_Noise, ADV_Inva, ADV_Homo and ADV_Hbd. Moreover, the
simulation results showed in Section 6.5 demonstrated that AS requires much
less storage cost than SII. Therefore, AS with similarity threshold functions
significantly reduced storage cost caused by distributed trust-related data stor-
age, and provided resilience to node invalidation and ADV ’s pollution attacks.
As our future work, we intend to investigate time-aware trustworthiness gen-
eration for UWSNs under different trust models, e.g., indirect trust.
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Chapter 7
Sensor Capture Resistance
The previous chapters discussed intrusion-resilient data security when a sensor
is captured and compromised. In this chapter we investigate 1) how to detect
a captured sensor, and 2) how to reduce the effects of compromised sensors.
We propose a node capture resistance and key refreshing scheme based on
the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) for mobile UWSNs. The scheme is
able to provide forward security, backward security and collusion resistance
for diminishing the effects of capture attacks.
7.1 Related Work
The security issues in Mobile UWSNs (MUWSN) have received little attention
so far in general. A few related studies regarding replica node attacks [40] and
intrusion-resilience [25] can be found in the literature, but none of them have
considered node capture attacks. The first work on detecting mobile node
capture attacks is [19], which proposed a scheme depending on cooperation of
honest sensors to detect possible sensor captures. However, it did not consider
how to provide forward security, backward security, and resistance to collusion
attack.
Group key management schemes can be classified into two categories: dis-
tributed group key management schemes and centralized group key manage-
ment schemes. Distributed group key management schemes relaying on Diffie-
Hellman (DH) [83, 47, 9] and discrete logarithm [104, 16] are considered to be
too expensive in computation for WSNs. Centralized group key management
schemes [38, 37, 106] cannot satisfy the overall requirements of forward secu-
rity, backward security and resistance to collusion attack needed for Mobile
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WSNs. A set of improved centralized group key management schemes, e.g.,
Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) [107, 110], Efficient Large-group Key (ELK) [68],
One-way Function Trees (OFT) [80], One-way Function Chain Tree (OFCT)
[13], which are based on certain hierarchical structure, require O(log n) keys
to be computed, received and stored by each group member, where n is the
number of group members. It causes large overhead for sensors with limited
resources. The secure broadcasting protocol, Secure Lock [18], requires O(n)
encryptions for each real data broadcast. The authors in [118] improved Secure
Lock [18] where only one encryption is needed for each real data broadcast.
Our work in this study extends [118] by further providing authentication and
integrity for distributing group keys.
7.2 Models and Assumptions
7.2.1 Network Model
Consider an MUWSN that consists of N mobile sensors (denoted S) and one
MS (the number ofMS could be more than one, but for the sake of simplicity
we assume only oneMS in the network). All the sensors are partitioned into
M groups denoted as G1, · · · , Gk, · · · , GM . Each group consists of Nk sensors
denoted as Gk = {sk,1, · · · , sk,i, · · · , sk,Nk}, and an initial group key GKk is
selected for each group, k ∈ [1,M ]. Thus G1 ∪ · · · ∪ GM = S and
∑M
k=1Nk =
N . sk,i is a sensor in group Gk, and is loaded with the corresponding group
key GKk and a secret key Kk,i, which are set up before the deployment of
the MUWSN, where Kk,i is an integer over GF (2q), q is the length of keys,
and gcd(Kk,i,Kk,j) = 1, i 6= j. The MS stores all secret keys of sensors,
denoted as {K1, · · · ,Kk, · · ·KM}, where Kk is a set of secret keys of Gk and
Kk = {Kk,1, · · · ,Kk,i, · · · ,Kk,Nk}. Each sensor is able to perform modular and
XOR operations. MS is not constrained by available computational capability
and energy. This is a reasonable assumption in many monitoring applications.
For example, we can deploy more than one unmanned submarines where one
is on duty and the rest can be on the way or recharge batteries. In addition,
theMS is considered as a trusted party that cannot be compromised.
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7.2.2 Adversary Model
We assume that a mobile adversary M_ADV is able to capture one node
at a time and remove it from the network, and that the only way to access
(or modify) the memory of a sensor is first to remove the sensor from the
network and then to temper with it. Here, we define time interval CP as
M_ADV ’s compromise power, meaning thatM_ADV is able to capture one
node, compromise it to learn its secret key, and re-deploy it back to the network
within the time interval of CP . Moreover, based on the secret key obtained
from captured sensor nodes,M_ADV is able to launch the following attacks
to the network:
• Surveillance hole attack: M_ADV re-programmes the captured sensor
and redeploys it into the network to make an unsurveilled hole so that
M_ADV can go through the surveillance area undiscovered.
• Communication analysis attack: M_ADV is able to record the com-
munication within the network and try to decrypt the communication
record.
• Node replica attack: M_ADV is able to generate a large number of
replica nodes and spread them throughout the network to mix up the
network communication.
7.2.3 Security Requirements
As all the sensors are divided into several groups, group communication is
encrypted and thus protected by group keys. Security requirements are thus
converted to how to update group key for all group members except the revoked
sensor, and further prevent the group communication from suffering attacks
(see Subsection 7.2.2) launched by M_ADV with the help of key material
from the captured sensor. A group key GKk can be updated m times each
with a key as GKk,t, t ∈ [1,m]. Denote the set of group keys as GKk =
{GKk,1, · · · ,GKk,t, · · · ,GKk,m}. We now define security requirements.
Definition 7.1. (Group Key Security) Group key security is provided if
for any sensor sk,i ∈ Gk, it is efficient to obtain GKk,t based on its secret key
Kk,i and broadcast value X . For any sensor sk′,i′ /∈ Gk, it holds that:
|Pr{GKk′,t′|X ,Kk′,t′} − Pr{GKk′,t′}| < (q),
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where (q) is a negligible polynomial related to security parameter q. q usually
is the length of the security parameter.
Definition 7.2. (Backward Security) Backward security is provided if for
any set Rk,t′ ⊂ Gk, where Rk,t′ is a set of revoked sensors from Gk before
session t′, it is computationally infeasible for sensors from Rk,t′ working to-
gether to get any information about GKk,t (t ≥ t′), even when the group keys
{GKk,1, · · · ,GKk,t′−1} are available.
Definition 7.3. (Forward Security) Forward security is provided if for
any set Ak,t′ ⊂ S, where Ak,t′ is a set of added sensors after session t′, it
is computationally infeasible for sensors from Ak,t′ working together to ob-
tain any knowledge about GKk,t (t < t′), even when a set of group keys
{GKk,t′ ,GKk,t′+1, · · · ,GKk,m} after session t′ are available.
Definition 7.4. (Collusion Resistance) Let E ⊆ Rk,t′ be a collusion of
sensors revoked before session t′ and let F ⊆ Ak,t′′ be a set of colluding sensors
added after session t′′. For any t ∈ T = [t′, t′′), sensors in E ∪ F cannot gain
any information about GKk,t even by sharing their knowledge.
7.3 SCARKER: Sensor Capture Resistance and
Key Refreshing
In this section, we present our SCARKER scheme. Before giving the detailed
description, we first present the general idea of the sensor capture detection
scheme based on [19].
7.3.1 General Idea
The basic idea of the captured sensor detection scheme [19] is that a sensor
can raise an alert message if it detects that another sensor has disappeared
since each sensor is aware of the existence of other sensors in the network. The
detection scheme can be further divided into two classes: Simple Distributed
Detection (SDD), in which a captured sensor is detected using information
local to the sensors; and Cooperative Distributed Detection (CDD), which
exploits local sensor cooperation to improve the detection performance.
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Let us consider an example, as addressed in Section 7.2, where each sensor
sk,i shares an initial secret key Kk,i and a group key GKk with MS. In the
beginning, none of those keys are known to M_ADV . Let sk,a, sk,b, sk,c ∈
Gk (a 6= b 6= c) and these three sensors are responsible for tracking each other.
With SDD, if sensor sk,a has observed a transmission originated by sensor sk,b
(a meeting occurred), but sk,a does not re-meet sensor sk,b again for a given
time interval λk1 (λk < CP), then sk,a can deduce that sk,b has probably been
captured byM_ADV , and consequently sends an alert message toMS, where
Prre−m denotes sensor re-meeting probability. To improve the performance of
SDD, sk,a in CDD can take the advantage of other sensors’meeting information
with sk,b to reduce false alert probability. That is, sk,a and sk,c can exchange
meet time information Tb of sk,b when they meet, where sk,a and sk,c can
compare Tb when they met sk,b last time and update the time which is more
recent. Indeed, CDD can reduce false revocation since if sk,a does not re-meet
sk,b within λk (even though Prre−m = 1−Prre−m ≈ 0, it still happens especially
in practical MUWSN), sk,a can use Tb from other sensors as an evidence that
sk,b is still a legal group member.
Upon receiving γ alert messages from sensors (we will discuss later the se-
lection of γ),MS will broadcast a revoke-sensor message (see Subsection 7.3.4)
in order to revoke sensor which is considered as a captured one. If, Nk, the
number of sensors in a group decreases due to sensor revoking, it makes sen-
sors more difficult to meet each other (λk increases) and it may also increase
false alert messages. As a consequence,MS needs to add new sensors into the
group to guarantee network connectivity. When Nk < NT ,MS will broadcast
an add-sensor message (described in Subsection 7.3.5 and Subsection 7.3.6) to
compute new group key for including new sensor into the group, where NT is
a pre-specified threshold and can be specified as the number of sensors in Gk
when Prre−m approaches to 1.
Discussion: The proposed scheme may have false positives. That is, sk,b
may be revoked from Gk by mistake, while sk,b is an uncaptured node. Indeed,
false positives exist ifMS decides to revoke sk,b as long asMS receives only
one alert message regarding sk,b. To reduce false positives,MS can decide to
1To specify time interval λk, the authors in [19] conducted a simulation based on the
random way-point mobility model [11] to investigate the sensor re-meeting probability that
two sensors re-meet again after λk seconds. Through simulation, λk can be specified as when
the sensor re-meeting probability Prre−m approaches to 1. To guarantee λk < CP, given a
fixed area, increasing Nk will decrease λk.
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revoke sk,b from Gk if up to γ (γ ≥ 1) alert messages regarding sk,b are received.
By doing so, the false positives decreases as γ increases. However, if MS
tolerates γ−1 alert messages, the proposed scheme would have false negatives,
which occur when a captured node is considered, by mistake, as a normal
one. As γ increases,MS ignores more alert messages, which may lead to false
negatives. We observe that false negatives have more serious consequences than
false positives because false positives only cause that the number of sensors
decreases faster, whereas, false negatives give chances toM_ADV to launch
various attacks as described in Subsection 7.2.2. It is therefore more realistic
to tolerate a few false positives but have no false negatives. Hence, we set
γ = 1 in our scheme. Furthermore, to keep zero false negative,MS needs to
add sensors in Gk to guarantee Nk > NT . Table 7.1 describes the influence of
NT on λk, the detection time, the number of false positives and the number of
false negatives.
Table 7.1: Influence of NT on λk, detection time, false positives and false
negatives.
NT λk Detection Time False Positives False Negatives
Increase (↗) ↘ ↘ ↘ ↘
Decrease (↘) ↗ ↗ ↗ ↗
7.3.2 Broadcast Value Generation
In this subsection, the details of broadcast value generation algorithms are
addressed.
Firstly,MS picks a random number GK′k (GK′k 6= GKk) over GF (2q) as a
new group key if GK′k ⊕Kk,i < Kk,i, and then computes ri(1 ≤ i ≤ Nk) using
GK′k and secret keys Kk,i shared with sensors as follows:
ri ← GK′k ⊕Kk,i, (7.1)
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where ri < Kk,i, and further constructs a congruence system using ri as follows:
X ≡ r1 (modKk,1)
X ≡ r2 (modKk,2)
...
X ≡ ri (modKk,i)
...
X ≡ rNk (modKk,Nk).
(7.2)
Obviously, the above congruence system satisfies the requirement of a CRT
system having a unique solution. For any broadcast value X obtained from
congruence system (Eq. (7.2)), the group key, GK′k, can be obtained according
to GK′k = ((X mod Kk,i)⊕Kk,i). TheMS is thus able to solve the congruence
system and find X . Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4 are given for new broadcast
value generation and new group key generation, respectively.
7.3.3 Membership Adjustment Command
The following commands need to be implemented in our scheme:
• Add sensor: a new sensor is added into the group.
• Revoke sensor: a sensor is revoked from the group.
• Key update: the group key is updated.
• Merge: merge two groups of sensors.
The following subsections introduce the three operations that implement
the above commands. Note that key update is a special case of revoke com-
mand protocol, where the group key is updated without any sensor revoked
from the group.
7.3.4 Sensor Revocation
Let us consider a group of sensors Gk = {sk,1, sk,2, · · · , sk,Nk}. When MS
concludes that a sensor is captured and should be revoked from the group, it
executes a CRT-based scheme to update the group key of each sensor in the
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Algorithm 3: X_GEN
/* Generate a new broadcast value and broadcast it. */
INPUT : Kk = {Kk,1,Kk,2, · · · ,Kk,j, · · · ,Kk,Nk}, GKk
OUTPUT: broadcast value X
1 select GK′k ∈ GF (2p), where GK′k 6= GKk and GK′k ⊕Kk,i < Kk,i.;
/* Compute a new broadcast value X using CRT. */
2 for {i = 1; i ≤ Nk; i+ +} do
3 ri ← GK′k ⊕Kk,i.;
4 end
5 for {i = 2; i < Nk; i+ +} do
6 ci ← 1
7 for {j = 1; j < i− 1; j + +} do
8 U ← K−1k,j mod Kk,j
9 ci ← U ∗ ci mod Kk,j
10 end
11 end
12 U ← r1
13 X ← U
14 for {i = 2; i < Nk; i+ +} do
15 U ← (ri − x) ∗ ci mod Kk,i
16 X ← X + U ∗ Πi−1j=1Kk,j
17 end
18 delete {r1, r2, · · · , rNk}
19 Seq_no← Seq_no+ 1;
20 return {X ||Seq_no||h(X||Seq_no)||h(GK′k)}
group. In the proposed scheme, each sensor of the group except the revoked
sensor uses the broadcast value X , computed byMS, to compute a new group
key GKk. We now present the protocol in details.
On theMS side: Based on secret keys Kk and a current group key GKk,
MS generates a new broadcast value X according to Algorithm 3 and broad-
casts it. Here, we assume a suitable broadcast authentication protocol, e.g.,
multilevel µTESLA [51] for secure and reliable transmission of such broadcast
value X . That is,
MS → ∗ : {X ||Seq_no||h(X||Seq_no)||h(GK′k||Seq_no)},
where Seq_no is a nonce generated byMS (a nonce is an unpredictable bit
string, usually used to achieve freshness), h(·) is a secure hash function, GK′k
is the group key and "||" is concatenation. Thus it is easy for sensor to check
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Algorithm 4: GK_GEN
/* Compute a new group key based on broadcast value and
secret key. */
INPUT : Kk,i, {X ||Seq_no||h(X||Seq_no)||h(GK′k||Seq_no)}
OUTPUT: new group key GK′k
1 /* Compute the hash value of received X and Seq_no.*/
2 temp← h(X||Seq_no);
3 /* Compare temp with received h(X||Seq_no).*/
4 if (temp ?= h(X||Seq_no) received) then
5 compute GK′k ← ((X mod Kk,i)⊕Kk,i)
6 if (h(GK′k||Seq_no) ?= h(GK′k||Seq_no) received) then
7 return GK′k;
8 else
9 /* This message is not for this sensor. */;
10 Drop this message;
11 end
12 else
13 return received message is broken.;
14 end
the integrity of X (see Algorithm 4).
On the sensor side: Based on the received message and Kk,i, each sensor
sk,i computes a new group key GK′k according to Algorithm 4.
If the captured sensor is sk,i, thenMS deletes its secret key Kk,i from Kk.
That is
K′k ← Kk \ {Kk,i}. (7.3)
New broadcast value X ′ is thus obtained based onK′k according to Algorithm 3.
ThenMS broadcasts X ′ to all the sensors of group Gk.
Upon receiving X ′, the sensors within group Gk will compute the new group
key GK′k according to Algorithm 4. Indeed, the revoked sensor sk,i can also get
X ′, however, it is not able to compute GK′ based on X ′ (we defer the detailed
proof to Section 7.4 and a numeral example to Subsubsection 7.3.7.1).
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7.3.5 Sensor Join Operation
Let sk′,i /∈ Gk be the new sensor to be added. MS adds its corresponding
secret key Kk′,i into Kk. That is
K′k ← Kk ∪ {Kk′,i}.
Again,MS computes X ′ according to Algorithm 3 based onK′k, and broad-
casts X ′ to G′k = Gk ∪{sk′,i}. The sensors within G′k are able to compute GK′k
based on X ′.
7.3.6 Group Merge Operation
As discussed in Subsection 7.3.1, a network may be required to add several
sensors to improve network performance.
For instance, to add new sensors into group Gk when the number of mem-
bers in a group is lower than the certain threshold, we can deploy a new sensor
group, Gl, with group key GKl and combine these two groups into one. After
deploying the new sensor group Gl,MS combines two sets of secret keys (Kk
and Kl). That is
K′k = Kk ∪Kl
= {Kk,1, · · · ,Kk,Nk ,Kl,1, · · · ,Kl,Nl}. (7.4)
MS is able to compute X ′ based on K′k according to Algorithm 3 and
broadcast it to Gk and Gl. Again, after receiving the broadcast message,
the sensors within Gk and Gl will compute GK′ according to Algorithm 4
respectively (see Subsubsection 7.3.7.2 for a numeral example).
7.3.7 Two Numeral Examples
Two simple examples are given below to demonstrate how the proposed scheme
works.
7.3.7.1 Sensor revoke operation example
For simplicity, we assume that there are three sensors denoted as s2,1, s2,2, and
s2,3 in a group, G2, with secret keys K2,1 = 17, K2,2 = 19, and K2,3 = 15,
respectively. Assume that theMS regards s2,3 is a captured node. TheMS
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can delete K2,3 from K2 according to Eq. (7.3), i.e., K′2 ← K2 \ {K2,3}. The
MS computes broadcast value X = 24 and broadcasts it to s2,1, s2,2 and s2,3
on input K′2 according to Algorithm 3.
Upon receiving the value, X = 24, the sensors in G2 can compute group
key GK′2 according to Algorithm 4 as follows:
s2,1 : GK′2 = 22 ← ((24 mod 17)⊕ 17)
s2,2 : GK′2 = 22 ← ((24 mod 19)⊕ 19)
s2,3 : GK′2 = 14 ← ((24 mod 15)⊕ 15).
We consider s2,3 as revoked from G2 since it cannot compute the new group
key which is GK′2 = 22.
7.3.7.2 Group merge operation example
Since sensor join operation is a special case of group merge operation where
there is only one sensor added in the group Kl, we use an example to illustrate
how to add sensors in a group. We continue the example above. Since s2,3
is regarded as a captured sensor and revoked afterwards, the MS needs to
add new sensors to maintain network connectivity. Assume that a group G5
(s5,1 and s5,2 with secret keys K5,1 = 29 and K5,2 = 31 respectively) is going
to be added into G2. The MS applies Algorithm 3 to K′′2 = K′2 ∪ K5 =
{K2,1,K2,2,K5,1,K5,2} to obtain X = 149214 and then broadcasts it to all
sensors.
Upon receiving the value X = 149214, the sensors compute group key GK′′2
according to Algorithm 4 as follows:
s2,1 : GK′′2 = 20 ← ((149214 mod 17)⊕ 17)
s2,2 : GK′′2 = 20 ← ((149214 mod 19)⊕ 19)
s5,1 : GK′′2 = 20 ← ((149214 mod 29)⊕ 29)
s5,2 : GK′′2 = 20 ← ((149214 mod 31)⊕ 31).
As a consequence, both G2 and G5 are able to get group key GK′′2 = 20.
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7.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security aspects of SCARKER in terms of group
key security, forward security, backward security and collusion attack. We will
now show how our scheme confirms with all the security requirements specified
in Definitions 7.1- 7.4.
Lemma 7.5. M_ADV cannot derive r1, · · · , rNk based on the broadcast value
X without knowing Kk,1, · · · ,Kk,Nk .
Proof. Since the broadcast value X can be rewritten as X = aKk,i + ri, where
a is an integer and 1 ≤ i ≤ Nk, M_ADV must guess Kk,1, · · · ,Kk,Nk to
derive possible r1, · · · , rNk . However, it is computationally infeasible to guess
r1, · · · , rNk because of Kk,1, · · · ,Kk,Nk are secret even though M_ADV has
the broadcast value X . Furthermore, since broadcast value X varies from time
to time,M_ADV cannot verify the correctness of guess even whenM_ADV
has guessed the correct Kk,1, · · · ,Kk,Nk . As a consequence, analyzing a set of
broadcast values X without knowing Kk,1, · · · ,Kk,Nk cannot give r1, · · · , rNk .
Proposition 7.6. The proposed scheme provides backward security.
Proof. Let Rk,t′ ⊂ Gk, where Rk,t′ is a set of revoked sensors from Gk be-
fore the current session t′. The knowledge of Rk,t′ consists of a set of broad-
cast values X , revoked sensors’ secret keys KRk,t′ and the previous group keys
GKk,1, · · · ,GKk,t′−1 they obtained when they were in Gk. However, since the
secret keys of Rk,t′ are deleted from the new congruence system (in Eq. (7.3)),
the group key GKk,t (t > t′) is computed based on a new set of secret keys of
sensors Gk \ Rk,t′ . Thus a sensor in Rk,t′ can compute GKk,t unless it is able
to obtain the secret keys of Gk \ Rk,t′ . Moreover, according to Lemma 7.5 it
cannot derive GKk,t based on broadcast value X without knowing the secret
keys of Gk \ Rk,t′ . As a result, it cannot compute GKk,t to access the future
group communication any more. Thus, the backward security is provided.
Proposition 7.7. The proposed scheme provides forward security.
Proof. Let Ak,t′ * Gk, where Ak,t′ denotes a set of new sensors added into
Gk after session t′. The information of Ak,t′ knows is a set of broadcast
values X , the newly added sensors’ secret keys KAk,t′ and the group keys
GKk,t′ , · · · ,GKk,m they obtained after joining the group. Since the new group
Sensor Capture Resistance 117
key GK′k,t of G′k, where G′k = Gk∪At′ , is randomly selected and has no relation
to any previous group key, the knowledge about the newly added sensors does
not help to compute GK′k,t. The previous group key can be successfully derived
if and only ifM_ADV can solve the congruence system without knowing the
corresponding secret keys of Gk, which is impossible according to Lemma 7.5.
Therefore, the forward security is provided.
Proposition 7.8. The proposed scheme prevents group communication from
collusion attack.
Proof. Let E ⊆ Rk,t′ be a collusion of sensors revoked before session t′ and let
F ⊆ Ak,t′′ be a collusion of sensors added after session t′′ where Rk,t′ ∪Ak,t′′ 6=
G′k. Consider the worst case (i.e., E = Rk,t′ and F = Ak,t′′). The sensors of
E ∪ F work together to launch collusion attack based on the knowledge they
obtained when Rk,t′ was in the group before session t′ and Ak,t′′ was in the
group after session t′′. The knowledge of Rk,t′ got is the group keys GK′k =
{GKk,1, · · · ,GKk,t′−1} before session t′ and their secret keys KRk,t′ . Meanwhile,
the information of Ak,t′′ consists of the group keys GK′′k = {GKk,t′′ , · · · ,GKk,m}
and the sensors secret keys KAk,t′′ . Since broadcast values X are broadcast,
they can be known by both Rk,t′ and Ak,t′′ . The knowledge of Rk,t′ ∪ Ak,t′′
is represented by {KRk,t′ ∪ KAk,t′′ ,X ,GK′k,GK′′k}. According to Eq. (2.1) in
Chapter 2, X can be presented as
X = r1Q1U1 + r2Q2U2 + · · ·+ rNkQNkUNk (modKk), (7.5)
where Kk =
∏Nk
i=1Kk,i, Kk ∩ (KRk,t′ ∪ KAk,t′′ ) = ∅, Qi = KkKk,i and Ui is its
multiplicative inverse modulo Kk,i, i.e., Ui = Q−1i (modKk,i). Due to Kk ∩
(KRk,t′ ∪ KAk,t′′ ) = ∅, the sensors in Rk,t′ ∪ Ak,t′′ would have to solve Eq. (7.5)
containing at least k variables where k 6= 1 in order to guess X . Furthermore,
since the congruence system is updated after each group membership change
and Rk,t′ ∪ Ak,t′′ 6= G′k, the secret information held by sensors in Rk,t′ ∪ Ak,t′′
will not give any knowledge about the new congruence system as long as KG′k
is large enough, where KG′k is a set of secret keys of G′k. Therefore, according
to Lemma 7.5, the proposed scheme is collusion resistant.
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7.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, the performance of SCARKER is evaluated from both the
sensor perspective and theMS perspective.
1. Sensor side: We implement the SCARKER on a Sun SPOT [86] based
sensor network testbed with 180 MHz 32 bit ARM920T core, 512K RAM
and 4M flash (ROM). The experiment is iterated 100 times to reduce
randomness.
2. MS side: The experimental results are obtained through a Maple [61]
simulator we developed. The experiment is iterated 25 times and is con-
ducted in an Acer laptop with Inter Celeron M processor 520 (1.6 GHz,
533 MHz, 1 MB L2 cache) and 1 G RAM for evaluating the computation
cost ofMS.
The experimental results in terms of computation cost, storage cost and com-
munication cost are given below.
7.5.1 Time and Energy Required for Computing New
Group Key
Updating a new group key, each sensor needs to perform one modular operation
X modKk,i and one XOR operation. The total computation cost at each sensor
is ModqX + XOR
q, where ModqX denotes that X modulo a number with size
q, and XORq denotes XOR operation with input size of q. Consequently we
can see that the computation cost is a function of q and X . As shown in
Fig. 7.1, we observe that the length of X is affected by q and Nk. For q = 24
and Nk = 30, the length of X is 705 bits. Upon receiving a 705 bits X ,
each sensor performs operation ModqX +XOR
q. We measure that the time for
computing group key is 170 ms and its corresponding energy consumption is 64
mJ. Please refer to Table 7.2 for more experiment results of computation cost
and energy consumption according to Algorithm 4 with respect to q and Nk.
Our experiment results show that the computation cost is low and affordable
by sensors.
On theMS side, theMS needs to compute Algorithm 3 caused by group
member change. Fig. 7.2 shows the execution time of group key generation in
terms of q and Nk. We can observe that the execution time increases linearly
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Table 7.2: Sensor side: Experiment results in terms of the length of secret key
Kk,i and the number of group members Nk.
Computation cost (ms) Energy consumption (mJ)
Nk 10 20 30 40 10 20 30 40
q = 24(bit) 56 113 170 228 16.5 40 64 89
q = 28(bit) 129 267 407 546 49 105 165 225
with the increasing of q and Nk. When q = 28 and Nk = 30, the MS needs
merely 48.8 ms to generate the broadcast value X . This result indicates that
the computation cost of the proposed scheme is lightweight, even when the
updating of keys is frequent.
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Figure 7.1: MS side: The length of generated broadcast value X in terms of
the length of secret key Kk,i.
7.5.2 Storage Cost
The group key storage cost can be divided into two shares. On the one hand,
each sensor needs to spend q bits to store the group key; on the other hand,
it also needs to prepare log2X bits as buffer to store X . Upon computing a
new group key GK′, the sensors just delete X . Thus the storage cost of each
sensor is 2q bits without buffering and 2q+ log2X bits with buffering. Fig. 7.3
shows that the storage cost on each sensor with respect to q and Nk. When
120 Security Mechanisms in Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks
0 10 20 30 40
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Nk, the number of sensors in the group
Th
e 
ex
ec
ut
io
n 
tim
e 
(m
s)
 
 
q = 24 (bit)
q = 28 (bit)
Figure 7.2: MS side: The execution time in terms of the length of secret key
Kk,i and the number of group members Nk.
Nk = 20 and q = 28, the storage cost for each sensor is merely 56 bits without
buffering and 606 bits with buffering. Therefore, the storage cost for each
sensor is affordable.
The MS needs to store N pairwise key and M group key. The storage
cost is (N + M)q. When N = 400, M = 10 and q = 28, the storage cost is
11480 bits. Thus the storage cost onMS is negligible.
7.5.3 Communication Cost
Upon updating a group key, the MS just broadcasts X to the sensors in its
group. Since communication cost is variable depending on the transmission
distance between the sensors and theMS, we cannot measure the exact value
of communication cost when sensors are mobile. However, it is easy to know
that the length of broadcast value is merely logX bits. Thus we measure the
communication cost of our scheme based on logX . Fig. 7.1 shows the length
of X with respect to Nk and q. For example, when q = 24 and Nk = 30, the
length of the broadcast value X is 705 bits. Hence, the communication cost is
affordable.
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Figure 7.3: Sensor side: The storage cost in terms of the length of secret key
Kk,i and the number of group members Nk.
7.6 Summary
In this chapter, we propose SCARKER to provide both forward security and
backward security as well as collusion resilience in addition to node capture
detection. We demonstrate that SCARKER is lightweight where each sensor
only needs to perform one modular operation and one XOR operation for each
group key update, significantly reducing the computation overhead of sensors.
It is worth mentioning that the time to compute group key and the length
of broadcast value (hence the communication cost) are proportional to the
number of group members. Thus SCARKER is suitable for distributing secret
group key to a group with a small group size. In case that the number of group
members is large, we can divide the group into a number of subgroups with
suitable size. Then broadcast values are thus constructed for each subgroup
using CRT at acceptable expense.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter summaries the contributions of the research work covered by this
dissertation and suggests directions for future work.
8.1 Summary of the research and the scientific
contributions
In this dissertation, we address emerging security issues in UWSNs consider-
ing the fact that a trusted third party does not exist in such networks. We
investigate the challenges pertained to those problems, and propose to exploit
key evolution as well as (n,m) Reed-Solomon codes based scheme (i.e., ES)
to provide forward secrecy, probabilistic backward secrecy and data reliabil-
ity in absence of reliable nodes and communication channels. Compared with
existing schemes [23, 60, 21, 109], the ES does not rely on reliable nodes
and communication channels, and can be resilient to message failure and node
failure with certain probabilities.
However, as the ES only provides probabilities backward secrecy, HEHSS,
a homomorphic encryption and homomorphic secret sharing based scheme
is proposed to accomplish the goals of achieving forward secrecy, backward
secrecy, resilience to node compromises, reliability, and efficient storage and
transmission. Moreover, we demonstrate through the HEHSS that backward
secrecy of historical data can be achieved.
Furthermore, as an enhancement to the ES and theHEHSS, a constrained
optimization scheme, ODDS, is proposed for data distribution to maximize
security level of data and optimize data reliability. We show through MATLAB
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simulations that the optimal algorithm achieves both backward secrecy and
data reliability and has significant improvement over the state of art techniques
[60, 21, 109].
The ODDS is based on an assumption that sensors know their neigh-
bor’s security level. We use trustworthiness of sensors to denote their security
level and propose an efficient, robust and scalable trust management scheme
for UWSNs. Our approach, based on GHT and GPSR, reduces significantly
storage cost caused by distributed trust data storage. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of the scheme through detailed analysis and simulations using
MATLAB.
In addition to intrusion-resilient schemes mentioned above, we also intro-
duce SCARKER, a Sensor Capture Resistance and Key Refreshing scheme,
to reduce the consequences when a sensor is captured and compromised. The
SCARKER provides both forward security and backward security as well as
collusion resilience in addition to node capture detection. We demonstrate
that each sensor only needs to perform one modular operation and one XOR
operation for each group key update, significantly reducing the computation
overhead of sensors. Through implementing SCARKER in actual sensors, the
obtained experimental results show that SCARKER is especially efficient and
suitable for MUWSNs.
8.2 Future Work
Although many security mechanisms have been studied, there are still a num-
ber of open questions in UWSNs which need to be addressed, as outlined below.
Refer to [96] for more details.
8.2.1 Long-lived UWSNs
Consider network topology of static sensors with an MS. While there is no
static sink available, anMS visits the static sensors with irregular and even
unpredictable frequency. Consequently, each sensor must accumulate sensed
data and have the ability to wait long enough until a specified signal sent
by MS to oﬄoad data onto it. Since the memory size of sensor nodes is
limited, no matter how the data are compressed, the memory would be full
after certain phases. Thus MS has to access the network to oﬄoad data at
a reasonable interval. Otherwise, newly collected data (or old data) would
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be lost. However, in realistic scenarios, MS may fail to visit the UWSN as
planed for any unpredictable reasons (bad weather or blocked by adversaries,
for instance). In addition,MS may be specified to prolong visit time interval
for sending anMS to hostile environments (or unattended areas), something
which is highly risky (or costly). Hence, to develop secure, long-lived UWSNs,
we need to answer the following questions:
• How to reduce power consumption of security mechanism as little as
possible.
• How to compress sensed data in a more efficient way?
• How to design power management scheme to prolong both battery life-
time and network lifetime?
8.2.2 SKC-based Distributed Data Access Control
Access control is a mechanism to prevent unauthorized use of resources, in-
cluding the prevention of use of a resource in an unauthorized manner [82].
Generally, the data access strategy of WSNs can be divided into two ways,
namely access control at the base station or access control at sensor nodes. In
traditional WSNs, sensor nodes transmit generated data to a base station that
users can access by querying through the base station. Access control strategy
is adopted in the base station side rather than in the sensor nodes. Since the
base station is not constrained by resources (computation, energy, memory,
etc.), many access control policies [78, 77] can be applied. In UWSNs, as a
large amount of sensed data are stored in individual sensor nodes, the data
storage and access have to be protected by using encryption, so that the data
can only be accessed by authorized users with the corresponding keys.
Existing literature [115, 117] addressing distributed data access control
policy of UWSNs is based on PKC which is considered to be too expensive
to implement in commodity sensors. The authors in [84] have proposed an
SKC based distributed data storage and retrieval scheme, where access control
policy is provided by sharing the symmetric key with authorized users based
on perturbed polynomials [8]. It has, however, not been proven to be secure
in [2]. Therefore how to design an SKC-based distributed data access control
scheme in UWSNs remains as another open question.
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8.2.3 Protecting MS
To the best of our knowledge, currently there is no literature that addresses
location privacy of MS in UWSNs. When an MS visits the static sensors
to collect accumulated data, if the location of the MS is detected by an
adversary, the adversary can easily capture or destroy MS. Since an MS
usually holds the network secret key and has higher privilege than sensors,
once an MS is compromised, secret keys and privileges granted to it will be
abused. Therefore, the open questions with this respect include:
• How to protect the location privacy of anMS?
• How to avoid impersonating the behavior of a realMS in the event that
it is captured (or comprised) by an adversary?
• How to design the optimal travel route to collect accumulated sensor
data with least security risk toMS?
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